Tasha C. Dillard v. Robert S. Dillard

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Tasha Cape Dillard, Respondent,

v.

Robert Scott Dillard, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2024-001174

Appeal From Anderson County
David E. Phillips, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-097
Submitted February 19, 2025 – Filed March 17, 2025

AFFIRMED

Heather Vry Scalzo, of Offit Kurman, of Greenville, for
Appellant.

Tasha Cape Dillard, of Greenville, pro se.

Amie Sarah Carpenter, of Greenville, as Guardian ad
Litem.

PER CURIAM: Robert Scott Dillard (Father) appeals a family court order
granting him and Tasha Cape Dillard (Mother; collectively, Parents) joint physical
custody of their minor child (Child). On appeal, Father argues the family court
erred in (1) granting the parties joint custody of Child and setting a schedule giving
Mother placement of Child on alternating weeks from Wednesday to Sunday and
(2) assigning "little weight" to the expert who testified regarding Mother's behavior
as recorded in multiple interactions. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

On appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de
novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).
Therefore, an appellate court "has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its
view of the preponderance of the evidence." Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 384,
709 S.E.2d 650, 651 (2011) (quoting Eason v. Eason, 384 S.C. 473, 479, 682
S.E.2d 804, 807 (2009)). "However, this broad scope of review does not require
the appellate court to disregard the fact that the family court, which saw and heard
the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign
comparative weight to their testimony." Tomlinson v. Melton, 428 S.C. 607, 611,
837 S.E.2d 230, 232 (Ct. App. 2019). Moreover, "the appellant bears the burden
of convincing the appellate court that the family court committed error or that the
preponderance of the evidence is against the court's findings." Id. at 611-12, 837
S.E.2d at 232.

1. We hold the family court did not err in granting Parents joint custody of Child.
Although South Carolina law generally disfavors joint custody, the family court's
custody determination did not confer a true joint custody arrangement; rather, it
granted Father primary placement and decision-making authority and granted
Mother physical custody every other week from Wednesday afternoon to Sunday
afternoon. We also hold joint physical custody was in Child's best interest because
Child had a half-sister, with whom she was close, who primarily lived with
Mother. Furthermore, although Father described some concerning behavior by
Mother prior to the parties' separation, Parents both underwent psychological
evaluations during the custody action, and the report generated following Mother's
evaluation indicated she had the adequate psychological resources to function in
the role of a custodial parent. Importantly, at the time of the final hearing, Mother
had shared joint custody of Child for over two years without any specific reported
incidents. Likewise, although Father asserts that after the family court ordered
joint custody of Child he noticed Child crying more, showing signs of anxiety, and
periods of frustration, he has not shown these behaviors were specifically due to
joint custody rather than Parents' separation generally. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-3-530(A)(42) (2010) ("The family court has exclusive jurisdiction . . . to order
joint or divided custody where the court finds it is in the best interests of the
child."); Scott v. Scott, 354 S.C. 118, 125, 579 S.E.2d 620, 624, (2003) (explaining
South Carolina disfavors joint custody but reiterating that the "focus remains on
the best interest of the child"); Tomlinson, 428 S.C. 60 at 612-13, 837 S.E.2d at
233 (noting the disfavor of alternating weekly custody during the school year);
Spreeuw v. Barker, 385 S.C. 45, 59, 682 S.E.2d 843, 850 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The
paramount and controlling consideration in a custody dispute is the best interests of
the child."). Accordingly, we hold the family court did not err when it assigned
Father sole legal custody and granted joint physical custody.

2. We hold the family court did not err in assigning "little weight" to testimony
from Father's expert witness. See Tomlinson, 428 S.C. at 611, 837 S.E.2d at 232
(explaining the de novo standard of review "does not require the appellate court to
disregard the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in
a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their
testimony"). In making its decision, the family court considered the expert's
testimony and ultimately decided to assign less weight to it because the expert was
not Mother's treating psychologist, had not met Mother outside of the courtroom,
and had only reviewed material supplied by Father. See Terwilliger v. Terwilliger,
298 S.C. 144, 147, 378 S.E.2d 609, 611 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating the family court,
as the fact finder, determines the weight to be given to testimony). Accordingly,
because the family court fully considered the testimony amongst the other
evidence, we defer to its determination of the weight to be granted to the
testimony.

AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.