Robert Sarn v. James Rhea, III

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Robert H. Sarn, Appellant,

v.

James C. Rhea, III; City Electric Supply Company; John
Doe, a fictitious person representing the class of all
unknown adult, mentally competent, unimprisoned,
non-military persons, who claim any right, title, or
interest in, lien upon, the entity designated as "Täschner
Textiles Industries, LLC"; Richard Roe, another fictitious
person representing the class of all unknown persons who
are either: under the age of eighteen (18) years,
imprisoned, or in the Armed Forces, and who claim any
right, title or interest in or lien upon, the entity designated
as Täschner Textile Industries, LLC," Defendants,

Of which James C. Rhea, III and Täschner Textile
Industries, LLC are the Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2021-001081

Appeal From York County
Teasa Kay Weaver, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-038
Submitted January 1, 2025 – Filed February 5, 2025

AFFIRMED
John Martin Foster, of Rock Hill, for Appellant.

Daniel Joseph Ballou, of Morton & Gettys, LLC, of Rock
Hill; and James Nathanial Pierce, of Johnston Allison &
Hord, PA, of Charlotte, North Carolina, both for
Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Robert Sarn appeals the master-in-equity's order granting
summary judgment to James Rhea, III (Rhea) and Täschner Textiles Industries,
LLC (TTI) (collectively, Respondents). On appeal, Sarn argues the master
improperly granted summary judgment because discovery had not yet been
completed and he was not responsible for the upkeep of the easement. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the master-in-equity did not err in granting Respondents' motion for
summary judgment because Sarn unambiguously assumed responsibility for the
maintenance of the easement. See Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston,
378 S.C. 107, 109, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008) ("When reviewing a grant of
summary judgment, an appellate court applies the same standard used by the
[circuit] court."); Rule 56(c), SCRCP (explaining summary judgment is proper
when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law"). In the deed in which Sarn conveyed a plot of land to TTI's predecessor,
Sarn agreed to keep the easement in a "state of repair and condition as is
commensurate with the first[-]class nature of Grantor's development" until the land
was designated as a public right of way. He also executed a document granting the
easement at the same time as the deed, stating that Sarn "hereby agrees to be fully
responsible for the total cost for the upkeep and maintenance of [the easement]."
These clauses unambiguously indicate Sarn's intention to be solely responsible for
the upkeep of the easement. See Snow v. Smith, 416 S.C. 72, 85, 784 S.E.2d 242,
248 (Ct. App. 2016) ("When a deed is unambiguous, any attempt to determine the
grantor's intent when reserving the easement must be limited to the deed itself, and
using extrinsic evidence to contradict the plain language of the deed is improper.");
Madden v. Bent Palm Invs., LLC, 386 S.C. 459, 465, 688 S.E.2d 597, 600 (Ct.
App. 2010) ("A party may not create an ambiguity by reading a single sentence or
clause, but rather the contract and the language used must be considered as a
whole."); Klutts Resort Realty, Inc. v. Down'Round Dev. Corp., 268 S.C. 80, 88,
232 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1977) ("[W]here instruments are executed at the same time, by
the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction,
the courts will consider and construe the instruments together.").
Further, the master did not err in finding Sarn's outstanding discovery requests did
not bar summary judgment. See Dawkins v. Fields, 354 S.C. 58, 69, 580 S.E.2d
433, 439 (2003) (stating summary judgment "must not be granted until the
opposing party has had a full and fair opportunity to complete discovery"); Guinan
v. Tenet Healthsystems of Hilton Head, Inc., 383 S.C. 48, 54-55, 677 S.E.2d 32, 36
(Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that a party opposing summary judgment because they
have not been provided a full and fair opportunity to conduct discovery "must
advance a good reason why the time was insufficient under the facts of the case,
and why further discovery would uncover additional relevant evidence and create a
genuine issue of material fact."). Sarn admitted there were no other contracts
regarding the easement and failed to identify any reason why further discovery
would uncover additional evidence. See Dawkins, 354 S.C. at 69, 580 S.E.2d at
439 ("[T]he nonmoving party must demonstrate the likelihood that further
discovery will uncover additional relevant evidence and that the party is 'not
merely engaged in a "fishing expedition."'" (quoting Baughman v. American Tel.
and Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 112, 410 S.E.2d 537, 544 (1991))).
AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.