SCDSS v. Tayon Young

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Logan Cunningham and Tayon Young, Defendants,

Of whom Tayon Young is the Appellant.

In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000883

Appeal From Lexington County
W. Greg Seigler, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-044
Submitted January 31, 2025 – Filed February 3, 2025

AFFIRMED

Adam Sinclair Ruffin, of Ruffin Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Luke Taylor Moore and Jordan Alexander McWilliams,
both of South Carolina Department of Social Services, of
Lexington, for Respondent.
Machelle Yvonne Thompson, of Thompson & Sete'fano,
LLC, of Columbia, for the Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Tayon Young (Father) appeals a family court order terminating
his parental rights to his minor children (Children). On appeal, Father argues the
family court erred in (1) allowing the South Carolina Department of Social
Services (DSS) to introduce his criminal history, (2) finding he willfully failed to
support Children, (3) granting TPR on the statutory ground that Children had been
in foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months, and (4) finding
termination of parental rights (TPR) was in Children's best interests. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

"On appeal from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and legal
issues de novo." Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 79, 828 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App.
2019). Appellate courts review the family court's procedural and evidentiary
rulings for an abuse of the family court's discretion. Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C.
593, 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d 486, 486 n.2 (2018). Under the de novo standard of
review, this court may make its own findings of fact; however, we continue to
recognize the superior position of the family court to assess witness credibility. Id.
at 595, 813 S.E.2d at 487. Moreover, de novo review does not relieve the
appellant of the burden of showing that the preponderance of the evidence is
against the family court's findings. Id.

We hold the family court did not abuse its discretion in allowing DSS to admit
evidence of Father's criminal history. See Stoney, 422 S.C. at 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d
at 486 n.2 (explaining appellate courts review the family court's procedural and
evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard). Father's incarceration
status at the time of the hearing was relevant to the statutory grounds for TPR and
Children's best interests. See Rule 401, SCRE ("'Relevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."). As to his prior criminal history, Father did not
object to the admission of the report of the guardian ad litem (GAL), which put
forth more detailed information on his criminal history than was elicited at the TPR
hearing. Accordingly, the testimony at issue was cumulative to the GAL's report.
See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 140, 538 S.E.2d 285, 290-91
(Ct. App. 2000) (finding any error in the admission of cumulative evidence was
harmless).1

We hold clear and convincing evidence showed Father willfully failed to support
Children. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2024) (stating the family court
may order TPR upon finding a statutory ground for TPR is met and TPR is in the
child's best interest); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 336 S.C. 248, 254, 519
S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ct. App. 1999) (explaining the grounds for TPR must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence); § 63-7-2570(4) (providing a statutory ground
for TPR is met when a "child has lived outside the home of either parent for a
period of six months, and during that time the parent has wil[l]fully failed to
support the child"); id. (explaining that "[f]ailure to support means that the parent
has failed to make a material contribution to the child's care"). Uncontroverted
testimony showed Father had made no contributions—monetary or otherwise—to
Children's care during the pendency of the case. Although Father was incarcerated
at the time of the TPR hearing, Children were removed in November 2022, and
Father was not incarcerated until August 2023 at the earliest. Moreover, we find
Father's failure to support Children was willful because the DSS case worker
confirmed DSS did not prevent Father from offering support, and the GAL testified
Father told her that although he loved Children, he did not want to "be involved"
with DSS. See id. ("The court may consider all relevant circumstances in
determining whether or not the parent has wil[l]fully failed to support the
child . . . ."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Broome, 307 S.C. 48, 53, 413 S.E.2d 835,
839 (1992) ("Conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego
parental duties may fairly be characterized as 'willful' because it manifests a
conscious indifference to the rights of the child to receive support and consortium
from the parent."). Thus, we find clear and convincing evidence supports this
statutory ground.2

1
Father also argued on appeal that evidence of his criminal history was
inadmissible under Rule 404(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence; however,
this argument is not preserved because Father did not raise it at the TPR hearing.
See McLeod v. Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 657, 723 S.E.2d 198, 204 (2012) ("A party
may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal." (quoting
State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003))).
2
Because we hold clear and convincing evidence supports the aforementioned
statutory TPR ground, we decline to consider whether the remaining ground was
met. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Headden, 354 S.C. 602, 613, 582 S.E.2d 419,
425 (2003) (declining to address a statutory ground for TPR after concluding clear
and convincing evidence supported another ground).
Finally, we hold the family court properly found TPR was in Children's best
interests. See Smith, 343 S.C. at 133, 538 S.E.2d at 287 ("In a [TPR] case, the best
interests of the children are the paramount consideration."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-2620 (2010) ("The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest
and the parental rights conflict."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W., 402 S.C.
324, 343, 741 S.E.2d 739, 749-50 (2013) ("Appellate courts must consider the
child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary concern when determining
whether TPR is appropriate."). At the time of the TPR hearing, Children were
placed together in a pre-adoptive foster home. Although they had been in the
foster home for only one month at the time of the hearing, neither Father nor
Mother—whose rights were also terminated at the hearing—was in a position to
care for Children in the foreseeable future. The evidence showed Children, who
were two and three years old at the time of the hearing, were doing well and were
beginning to bond with their foster parents. Accordingly, we find TPR is in
Children's best interests. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2510 (2010) ("The purpose of
[the TPR statute] is to establish procedures for the reasonable and compassionate
[TPR] where children are abused, neglected, or abandoned in order to protect the
health and welfare of these children and make them eligible for adoption . . . .").

AFFIRMED. 3

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.