Steven Charles Poletti v. Charleston County Assessor

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Steven Charles Poletti, Appellant,

v.

Charleston County Assessor, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000980

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Robert Lawrence Reibold, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-028
Submitted November 1, 2024 – Filed January 29, 2025

AFFIRMED

Giampiero Diminich, Felix Chisolm Pelzer, Jr., and
Nicholas Clarence Chapman Stewart, all of Shumaker
Loop & Kendrick, LLP, of Charleston, for Appellant.

Kevin Michael DeAntonio and Bernard E. Ferrara, Jr.,
both of Charleston County Attorney's Office, of North
Charleston; and Brittney Marie Darnell, of Gordon &
Rees, LLP, of Charleston, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Steven Charles Poletti appeals an order of the Administrative
Law Court (the ALC) finding his dwelling on a neighboring property did not
qualify for the legal residence special tax assessment of four percent (the four
percent tax rate) pursuant to section 12-43-220(c)(1) of the South Carolina Code
(Supp. 2024). On appeal, Poletti argues the ALC erred in (1) interpreting section
12-43-220(c)(1) as requiring the five contiguous acres to exist on the same parcel,
have the same address, or have the same tax map identification number; (2)
granting summary judgment in favor of the Charleston County Assessor (the
Assessor) because there was an issue of material fact concerning Sullivan's Island's
ordinance against the combination of adjoining property lots; (3) violating his
equal protection rights in its interpretation of section 12-43-220(c)(1); and (4)
finding section 12-43-220(c)(1) was a tax exemption statute instead of a tax
classification statute. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the ALC did not err in interpreting section 12-43-220(c)(1) as
requiring the five contiguous acres to exist on the same parcel, have the same
address, or have the same tax map identification number. See CFRE, LLC v.
Greenville Cnty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 73, 716 S.E.2d 877, 880 (2011) ("Tax
appeals to the ALC are subject to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)."); id.
at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881 (explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for
errors of law); id. ("Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law,
which [the appellate court is] free to decide without any deference to the court
below."); Mead v. Beaufort Cnty. Assessor, 419 S.C. 125, 130, 796 S.E.2d 165,
168 (Ct. App. 2016) ("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the
disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131, 796
S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment have
been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not
already been filed by the parties); Wiegand v. U.S. Auto. Ass'n, 391 S.C. 159, 163,
705 S.E.2d 432, 434 (2011) ("Where cross motions for summary judgment are
filed, the parties concede the issue before us should be decided as a matter of
law."). The Manda Moore Poletti Qualified Personal Residence Trust, of which
Poletti was the primary beneficiary, owned the main property and Poletti owned
the neighboring property; the main property was Poletti's legal residence and
domicile. The main property and the neighboring property were separate
properties with different addresses and tax map identification numbers. We find
the five contiguous acres must have the same address as the legal residence
pursuant to section 12-43-220(c)(2)(i) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2024),
because the statute explicitly provides that "the owner-occupant must have actually
owned and occupied the residence as his legal residence and been domiciled at that
address for some period during the applicable tax year." (emphasis added).
Therefore, additional structures are not located on the same property as the legal
residence and five contiguous acres if the additional structures do not have the
same address as the legal residence. Accordingly, Poletti was not entitled to the
four percent tax rate on the neighboring property because (1) it was not his legal
residence and domicile, and (2) it did not share the same address as his legal
residence and domicile. See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578,
581 (2000) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the legislature."); id. ("Where the statute's language is plain
and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory
interpretation are not needed and [the appellate] court has no right to impose
another meaning."); S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Jasper Cnty., 368 S.C. 388, 398, 629
S.E.2d 624, 629 (2006) ("In construing statutory language, the statute must be read
as a whole and sections which are a part of the same general statutory law must be
construed together and each one given effect."); CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 74, 716
S.E.2d at 881 ("We therefore should not concentrate on isolated phrases within the
statute. Instead, we read the statute as a whole and in a manner consonant and in
harmony with its purpose."); Se.-Kusan, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 276 S.C. 487,
489, 280 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1981) ("As a general rule, tax exemption statutes are
strictly construed against the taxpayer."); id. ("This rule of strict construction
simply means that constitutional and statutory language will not be strained or
liberally construed in the taxpayer's favor. It does not mean that [the appellate
court] will search for an interpretation in the [Assessor's] favor where the plain and
unambiguous language leaves no room for construction."); id. at 489-90, 280
S.E.2d at 58 ("Only when the literal application of a statute produces an absurd
result will [the appellate court] consider a different meaning."); S.C. Const. art. X,
§ 1(3) ("The legal residence and not more than five acres contiguous thereto shall
be taxed on an assessment equal to four percent of the fair market value of such
property."); § 12-43-220(c)(1) ("The legal residence and not more than five acres
contiguous thereto, when owned totally or in part in fee or by life estate and
occupied by the owner of the interest, and additional dwellings located on the same
property and occupied by immediate family members of the owner of the interest,
are taxed on an assessment equal to four percent of the fair market value of the
property. If residential real property is held in trust and the income beneficiary of
the trust occupies the property as a residence, then the assessment ratio allowed by
this item applies if the trustee certifies to the assessor that the property is occupied
as a residence by the income beneficiary of the trust."); § 12-43-220(c)(2)(i) ("To
qualify for the special property tax assessment ratio allowed by this item, the
owner-occupant must have actually owned and occupied the residence as his legal
residence and been domiciled at that address for some period during the applicable
tax year.").
2. We hold that whether the ALC erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
the Assessor because there was an issue of material fact concerning Sullivan's
Island's ordinance against the combination of adjoining property lots is not
preserved for appellate review because Poletti first raised this issue in his motion to
reconsider. See Stevens & Wilkinson of S.C., Inc. v. City of Columbia, 409 S.C.
563, 567, 762 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2014) (holding an issue is not preserved for
appellate review if it was not raised to and ruled upon by the lower court);
Anderson Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Hagen, 313 S.C. 497, 498, 443 S.E.2d 399, 400 (Ct.
App. 1994) ("A party cannot use a motion to reconsider to present an issue he
could have raised prior to judgment but did not.").

3. We hold the ALC's interpretation of section 12-43-220(c)(1) did not violate
Poletti's equal protection rights because he failed to demonstrate an equal
protection violation. See CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 73, 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding
"[t]ax appeals to the ALC are subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881
(explaining the appellate court reviews ALC decisions for errors of law); Mead,
419 S.C. at 130, 796 S.E.2d at 168 ("The purpose of summary judgment is to
expedite the disposition of cases not requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at
131, 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining that when cross motions for summary judgment
have been filed, the court assumes there is no evidence to consider which has not
already been filed by the parties to the case); Wiegand, 391 S.C. at 163, 705 S.E.2d
at 434 ("Where cross motions for summary judgment are filed, the parties concede
the issue before us should be decided as a matter of law."); Bodman v. State, 403
S.C. 60, 69, 742 S.E.2d 363, 367 (2013) ("The South Carolina Constitution
provides that no 'person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.'" (quoting
S.C. Const. art. I, § 3)); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). Poletti failed to present any
specific evidence that persons in similar situations received disparate treatment,
and that this treatment was not related to a legitimate government purpose. See
TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 626, 503 S.E.2d 471, 479
(1998) ("In order to establish an equal protection violation, a party must show that
similarly situated persons received disparate treatment."); Town of Hollywood v.
Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 480, 744 S.E.2d 161, 168 (2013) ("Where an alleged equal
protection violation does not implicate a suspect class or abridge a fundamental
right, the rational basis test is used."); id. at 480, 744 S.E.2d at 168 ("To prevail
under the rational basis standard, a claimant must show similarly situated persons
received disparate treatment, and that the disparate treatment did not bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate government purpose."); Fraternal Ord. of Police v. S.C.
Dep't of Revenue, 352 S.C. 420, 432, 574 S.E.2d 717, 723 (2002) ("For tax
statutes, 'the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most
explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive
discrimination against particular persons and classes.'" (quoting Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))); Amazon Servs., LLC v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue,
442 S.C. 313, 340, 898 S.E.2d 194, 208 (Ct. App. 2024) (explaining the party
asserting an equal protection violation must present evidence specifically
identifying other similarly situated persons and their disparate treatment), cert.
granted (Oct. 3, 2024).

4. We hold the ALC did not err in interpreting section 12-43-220(c)(1) as a tax
exemption statute because the South Carolina Supreme Court previously held the
statute was a tax exemption statute and not a tax classification statute. See CFRE,
LLC, 395 S.C. at 73, 716 S.E.2d at 880 (holding "[t]ax appeals to the ALC are
subject to the [APA]"); id. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881 ("Questions of statutory
interpretation are questions of law, which [the appellate court is] free to decide
without any deference to the court below."); id. (stating the appellate court reviews
the ALC's decision for errors of law); Mead, 419 S.C. at 130, 796 S.E.2d at 168
("The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases not
requiring the services of a fact finder."); id. at 131, 796 S.E.2d at 168 (explaining
that when cross motions for summary judgment have been filed, the court assumes
there is no evidence to consider which has not already been filed by the parties to
the case); Wiegand, 391 S.C. at 163, 705 S.E.2d at 434 ("Where cross motions for
summary judgment are filed, the parties concede the issue before us should be
decided as a matter of law."); Ford v. Beaufort Cnty. Assessor, 398 S.C. 508, 515,
730 S.E.2d 335, 339 (Ct. App. 2012) (explaining the South Carolina Supreme
Court has previously held that section 12-43-220 of the South Carolina Code (2014
& Supp. 2024) was a tax exemption statute).

AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.