Audra Starnes v. Craig Stoneburner

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Audra Starnes, Respondent,

v.

Craig Stoneburner and Citivest Corporation, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000082

Appeal From Greenville County
Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-023
Heard October 8, 2024 – Filed January 29, 2025

AFFIRMED

Walter B. Todd, Jr., of Walter B. Todd, Jr., PC, of
Columbia, for Appellants.

Mark Paget Fessler, of S.C. Legal Services, of
Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this lease dispute over a rental house (the Property), Craig
Stoneburner and Citivest Corporation (collectively, Stoneburner) 1 appeal the
circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Audra Starnes. Stoneburner
argues (1) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Starnes for

1
Throughout the proceedings, Stoneburner and his corporation, Citivest
Corporation, were treated as a single entity.
Stoneburner's failure to deliver possession of the Property in compliance with the
South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (the Act),2 (2) the circuit
court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of treble damages, and (3)
Starnes was precluded from an award of attorney's fees because she received free
legal services. We affirm.

1. The circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to Starnes for
Stoneburner's failure to deliver possession in compliance with the Act. See Turner
v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 121-22, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011) ("When reviewing
a grant of summary judgment, appellate courts apply the same standard applied by
the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP."); id. at 122, 708 S.E.2d at 769
("Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and discovery on file show there is no genuine issue of material fact such that the
moving party must prevail as a matter of law."); id. ("When determining if any
triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."); § 27-40-430 ("At
the commencement of the [lease] term[,] a landlord shall deliver possession of the
premises to the tenant in compliance with the rental agreement and [s]ection
27-40-440.").

Under the Act,

[a] landlord shall: (1) comply with the requirements of
applicable building and housing codes materially
affecting health and safety; (2) make all repairs and do
whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the
premises in a fit and habitable condition; (3) keep all
common areas of the premises in a reasonably safe
condition, and, for premises containing more than four
dwelling units, keep in a reasonably clean condition; (4)
make available running water and reasonable amounts of
hot water at all times and reasonable heat except where
the building that includes the dwelling unit is not
required by law to be equipped for that purpose, or the
dwelling unit is so constructed that heat or hot water is
generated by an installation within the exclusive control
of the tenant and supplied by a direct public utility
connection; [and] (5) maintain in reasonably good and

2
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 27-40-10 to -940 (2007 and Supp. 2024).
safe working order and condition all electrical, gas,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air conditioning,
and other facilities and appliances, including elevators,
supplied or required to be supplied by him. Appliances
present in the dwelling unit are presumed to be supplied
by the landlord unless specifically excluded by the rental
agreement. No appliances or facilities necessary to the
provision of essential services may be excluded.

§ 27-40-440(a).

The Property was condemned on March 24 after being found unfit for human
occupancy by Greenville County Codes Enforcement Division (the Division). 3 A
sign was posted on the Property's front door declaring occupation of the Property
"unfit, unsafe, [and] unlawful." The Division also mailed Stoneburner an official
notice on March 25 which included a report detailing the Property's many defects.
The report cites structural flaws, electrical hazards, water supply issues, and
roofing failures, all of which violate section 27-40-440(a). Stoneburner argues he
complied with the Act because of an exception under section 27-40-440(c), which
allows a landlord to assign certain obligations to tenants of a single-family
residence. This section provides:

The landlord and tenant of a single[-]family residence
may agree in writing that the tenant perform the
landlord's duties specified in paragraph (5) of subsection
(a) and also specified repairs, maintenance tasks,
alterations, and remodeling, but only if the transaction is
entered into in good faith and not for the purpose of
evading the obligations of the landlord.

S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-440(c).

The Property is a single-family residence, and Starnes signed the lease agreement.
It stated, "For [v]alid consideration[, t]enants agree to provide [a]ppliances, heat
and [a]ir [equipment] if needed and agree to do any repairs, maintenance, etc[.] at
their cost (unless agreed to otherwise in writing) as needed on the [P]roperty to
keep it up to [c]ode." However, section 27-40-440(c) limits the assignable duties
of a landlord to only those "specified in paragraph (5) of subsection (a)" and

3
All dates refer to the 2021 calendar year.
"specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, and remodeling." (emphasis
added). The blanket provision in the lease agreement for "any repairs,
maintenance, etc[.] . . . as needed on the [P]roperty to keep it up to [c]ode" is not
allowed under this section. (emphasis added). While the duties specified in
paragraph (5) may be assigned, a landlord must perform the duties specified in
paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 27-40-440(c), which include keeping the
property up to code. Further, Stoneburner did not enter the lease in good faith, but
as a means to evade his duties as the landlord. 4 Stoneburner argues that summary
judgment was improper because he should have been given the opportunity to offer
testimony to refute the Division's findings regarding the state of the Property.
Given the extensive photographs in the record of the Property's poor condition and
the fact that any one of the issues cited above from the official notice's report
would have been grounds for condemnation, no genuine issue of material fact
exists. Therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment because
Stoneburner failed to deliver possession of the Property in compliance with the
Act.

2. The circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment on the issue of
treble damages. Though the circuit court's specific reasoning is not clear in its
Form 4 Order, there were sufficient grounds to grant summary judgment under
either section 27-40-620(b) or section 27-40-410(b).5 See § 27-40-620(b) ("If a
person's failure to deliver possession is willful and not in good faith, an aggrieved
person may recover from that person an amount not more than three months'
periodic rent or twice the actual damages sustained, whichever is greater, and
reasonable attorney's fees."); see also § 27-40-210(5) ("'[G]ood faith' means
honesty in fact in the conduct of the transaction concerned."). The record contains

4
When Starnes's requested help contacting a professional contractor, Stoneburner
replied, "[if] you keep bugging these people they will quit responding. Handymen
are not very dependable these days that's why our lease says y'all were willing to
keep the place up. Read it!"
5
In her motion for summary judgment, Starnes argued she was entitled to treble
damages under both section 27-40-620(b) and section 27-40-410(b). The circuit
court's Form 4 Order stated only that "[a]fter careful consideration of all relevant
filings and the arguments of counsel, [Starnes's] Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby granted." Similarly, the circuit court's denial of Stoneburner's motion to
alter or amend reads "the Court respectfully denies [Stoneburner's] Motion for the
reasons set forth in the Court's previous Order." Therefore, whether the circuit
court granted the motion on the issue of treble damages for Stoneburner's alleged
violation of section 27-40-620(b), section 27-40-410(b), or both is unclear.
substantial evidence Stoneburner was aware of defects violating section
27-40-440(a).6 Accordingly, we find that his breach was willful or at least not in
good faith and Starnes was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of treble
damages under section 27-40-620(b). Starnes was also entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of treble damages under section 27-40-410(b). Section 27-
40-410 states,

(a) Upon termination of the tenancy, property or money
held by the landlord as security must be returned less
amounts withheld by the landlord for accrued rent and
damages which the landlord has suffered by reason of the
tenant's noncompliance with [s]ection 27-40-510. Any
deduction from the security/rental deposit must be
itemized by the landlord in a written notice to the tenant
together with the amount due, if any, within thirty days
after termination of the tenancy and delivery of
possession and demand by the tenant, whichever is later.
The tenant shall provide the landlord in writing with a
forwarding address or new address to which the written
notice and amount due from the landlord may be sent. If
the tenant fails to provide the landlord with the
forwarding or new address, the tenant is not entitled to
damages under this subsection provided the landlord (1)
had no notice of the tenant's whereabouts and (2) mailed
the written notice and amount due, if any, to the tenant's
last known address.

(b) If the landlord fails to return to the tenant any prepaid
rent or security/rental deposit with the notice required to
be sent by the landlord pursuant to subsection (a), the
tenant may recover the property and money in an amount
equal to three times the amount wrongfully withheld and
reasonable attorney's fees.

6
After she toured the Property on March 8, Starnes sent Stoneburner photographs
depicting its poor condition. Between March 8 and March 20, Starnes notified
Stoneburner of several defects. On March 24, a sign was posted on the Property's
front door declaring it unfit for occupancy. On March 25, an official notice was
sent to Stoneburner which included a report detailing the many violations
summarized above.
On March 20, Starnes texted Stoneburner "The house isn't livable . . . . We need
our money back for it." Stoneburner argues this notice of termination was
invalidated by a subsequent text sent by Starnes claiming to still have a lease and
that proper written notice of termination was not given until April 15.7 We find the
date of termination to be of little importance because Stoneburner failed to comply
with section 27-40-410(a) under either date claimed. On April 29, Starnes texted
Stoneburner requesting he send the security deposit and prepaid rent to the
provided address of her attorney. Stoneburner then sent a Security Deposit
Transmittal Letter (the Letter) 8 but to a different address. The Letter was returned
and never sent to the address Starnes provided. Therefore, regardless of the date
used for termination, Stoneburner violated section 27-40-410(a) because he had
notice of Starnes's whereabouts and did not mail the Letter to her last known
address within thirty days of either date. Accordingly, the court did not err in
granting summary judgment on the issue of treble damages.

3. We do not address Stoneburner's argument that Starnes was precluded from an
award of attorney's fees because she received free legal services as this issue was
raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Rogers, 361 S.C. 178, 183, 603
S.E.2d 910, 912-13 (Ct. App. 2004) ("There are four basic requirements to
preserving issues at trial for appellate review. The issue must have been (1) raised
to and ruled upon by the trial court, (2) raised by the appellant, (3) raised in a
timely manner, and (4) raised to the trial court with sufficient specificity." (quoting
Jean Hoefer Toal et al., Appellate Practice in South Carolina 57 (2d ed. 2002)));
State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("An issue that
was not preserved for review should not be addressed by the [c]ourt . . . .").

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

7
Starnes claims she gave notice by the text she sent on March 20, making the date
of termination March 25. Stoneburner claims written notice was given on April
15, making the date of termination April 20.
8
The Letter was postmarked on May 1.