Yown v. Yown

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR
RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2),
SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Judy Anne Yown, Respondent,

v.

William Robert Yown, Appellant.

Appeal From Spartanburg County

 Georgia V. Anderson, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-145

Submitted November 1, 2007 – Filed March
6, 2008   

AFFIRMED

David Michael Collins, Jr., of Spartanburg, for Appellant.

Edward A. Lamb, Richard H. Rhodes, both of Spartanburg, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: William
Robert Yown (Husband) appeals from the family court order granting Judy Anne
Yown (Wife) a divorce, arguing the family court erred in its determination of
marital property, valuation of special equity interests, and equitable division
of the marital estate.  We affirm.[1]

FACTS

Husband and Wife were married on September 16, 1998.  At the time
of the marriage, both parties owned a pre-marital home and other personal
pre-marital property.  Approximately two years into the marriage, Husband and
Wife purchased a marital residence and subsequently sold their non-marital
homes.[2] 
A substantial portion of Husband’s proceeds from the sale of his non-marital
home was paid toward the mortgage on the marital home and a lot adjoining the
marital residence, both of which were titled jointly.  The remaining money from
the sale of the non-marital homes was deposited into a joint checking account.[3]

Approximately seven years into the marriage, Husband and Wife separated,
and Wife brought a separate maintenance action seeking equitable division of
the marital estate and attorney’s fees.  At the hearing, Wife moved to amend her
complaint to request a divorce on the ground of one year continuous separation.  The family court granted Wife’s motion and issued an order granting a
divorce, dividing the marital estate equally between the parties, and awarding
each party special equity interests in certain items of the marital estate.  This
appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The family court
has broad discretion in determining how marital property is to be valued and
distributed; therefore, the court may use any reasonable means to divide the
property equitably, and its judgment will only be disturbed where an abuse of
discretion is found.  LaFrance v. LaFrance, 370 S.C. 622, 650-651, 636
S.E.2d 3, 18 (2006).  In reviewing the family court’s equitable apportionment
of marital property, an appellate court’s role is to examine the fairness of
the apportionment as a whole.  Id. (citing Bragg v. Bragg, 347 S.C. 16, 24, 553 S.E.2d 251, 255 (Ct. App. 2001)).  Generally, an appellate court will affirm the family
court if it can be determined the judge addressed the factors under the marital
property statute sufficiently for the appellate court to conclude the judge was
cognizant of the statutory factors.  Id. (citing Jenkins v. Jenkins, 345
S.C. 88, 100, 545 S.E.2d 531, 537 (Ct. App. 2001)); see S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-472 (1985).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Property Adjoining Marital Residence and Special
Equity Interests

Husband
alleges the family court erred by classifying the property adjoining the
marital residence as marital property.  Husband also maintains the family court
erred in its identification and valuation of the special equity interests of
both parties in the marital residence.  We disagree. 

Husband
asserts the adjoining lot was nonmarital property because it was purchased with
proceeds from the sale of his pre-marital home.  Husband’s home was pre-marital
property, and, ordinarily, property acquired in exchange for pre-marital
property is not considered marital property.  However:

[i]n
certain circumstances, nonmarital property may be transmuted into marital
property if: (1) it becomes so commingled with marital property as to be
untraceable; (2) it is jointly titled; or (3) it is utilized by the parties in
support of the marriage or in some other manner so as to evidence an intent by
the parties to make it marital property.

Greene v. Greene, 351 S.C. 329, 338, 569 S.E.2d 393, 398 (Ct. App. 2002)(internal
citations omitted).  The property adjoining the marital estate was titled jointly. 
The parties constructed a barn on the adjoining land and used it to store
personal property belonging to both Husband and Wife.  The barn was constructed
using an equity line of credit, which was paid with funds from the couples’
joint account.  For these reasons, we do not find the family court erred by
classifying the property adjoining the marital estate as marital property.  Furthermore, Husband was awarded a special equity interest for funds from the sale of his pre-marital home, which he contributed to the
adjoining lot.       

Husband
also claims the family court erred in its identification and valuation of the
special equity interests of both parties in the marital residence.  In the
present case, the family court considered and ruled upon the special equity
interests of both Husband and Wife.  Accordingly, if Husband believed
the family court overlooked or failed to specifically rule on some additional
special equity interest, he had the burden of presenting this issue to the
family court.  However, Husband did not file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion raising
the issue of a specific equity interest valuation to the family court, and thus,
we find this issue is not preserved for appeal. See Wilder
Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998); see also Halbersberg v. Berry, 302 S.C. 97, 103, 394 S.E.2d 7, 12 (1990)
(finding the omission of the master in equity not preserved because the party
did not bring the omission to the attention of the master through a proper
motion).

The Division of the Marital Estate

Husband
further alleges the family court erred in calculating the division of the
marital estate.  Specifically, Husband argues the
family court erred by counting the value of the adjoining property twice in the
equitable division.  We find this issue is not preserved.  

After
the family court issued its order, Husband did not file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion
raising the issue of the double-inclusion of the adjoining lot to the family
court judge.  Thus, we find this issue is not preserved for appeal.  See Wilder, 330 S.C. at 76, 497 S.E.2d at 733; see
also Halbersberg, 302 S.C. at 103, 394 S.E.2d at 12.

CONCLUSION

Based
on the foregoing, we find the family court did not err in its determination of marital property,
valuation of special equity interests, or equitable division of the marital
estate.  Accordingly, the decision
of the family court is

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON, SHORT, and WILLIAMS JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] Prior to the marriage, Wife had a house, with a
mortgage, at 106 Blueberry Lane, Inman, and Husband had a house, with a
mortgage, at 116 Shenandoah Drive, Spartanburg.  After the marriage, Husband
and Wife resided in Husband’s Shenandoah home for approximately two years until
they moved to 221 Williams Drive, Campobello.

[3] From the beginning of their marriage, Husband and
Wife shared a joint checking account, which was managed by Husband with the
Wife’s consent.  Both incomes, which were approximately equal, went into this
account, and all bills, including mortgages and expenses for their non-marital
properties were paid from this account.