Frierson v. InTown Suites

THIS  OPINION 
HAS  NO  PRECEDENTIAL  VALUE.  IT  SHOULD NOT   BE   CITED   OR   RELIED  ON  
AS    PRECEDENT   IN  ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2),
SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Patricia Frierson, Appellant,

v.

InTown Suites,
Two Notch Road, Inc., Respondent.

Appeal From Richland County

 John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2007-UP-549

Submitted November 1, 2007 – Filed
December 14, 2007

AFFIRMED

Patricia Frierson, pro se, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Griffin Littlejohn and Ned Nicholson, both of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: 
Patricia Frierson appeals the magistrate court’s dismissal of her case against
InTown Suites (InTown) without prejudice.  We affirm.[1]

FACTS

According
to her Complaint dated July 1, 2002, Frierson began staying at InTown Suites on
October 17, 2001, at a weekly rate of $165.00.  She allegedly encountered
several problems during her eight-month stay at InTown, including noise from
other guests, waste spilling out of the toilet, harassment by means of a warning
on Frierson’s car stating it might be towed, and blood stains on her mattress.  Frierson
claims InTown participated in unfair trade practices and she suffered severe
emotional distress as a result of the above events.  She sought actual damages
of $5,775 and $1,725 for pain and suffering.  In addition, Frierson sought “any
costs resulting in this action and any punitive damages the court deems
appropriate.” 

As part
of its defense, InTown filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state
a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, or alternatively, because Frierson’s
alleged damages exceeded the $7,500 jurisdictional limit of the magistrate’s
court. The matter was originally heard by Magistrate Golie Augustus on July 8,
2003, when he denied the motion to dismiss and set the case for trial on July
21, 2003.  Magistrate William Womble took over for Magistrate Augustus on an
emergency basis and heard the case on July 21, 2003, and orally dismissed
Frierson’s Complaint with prejudice. Frierson appealed Magistrate Womble’s oral
ruling to the circuit court on July 22, 2003.  By written order dated July 23,
2003, Magistrate Womble dismissed the complaint with prejudice in its entirety.
 

Judge
John Milling heard Frierson’s appeal on February 11, 2005.  At the hearing, Frierson
complained that Magistrate Womble’s signed order went outside the issues heard
on July 21, 2003.  Because Judge Milling was concerned that Magistrate Womble
granted the motion to dismiss after Magistrate Augustus had denied the motion,
he remanded the case to Magistrate Augustus for the preparation of a return
concerning the events of July 8, 2003.  In Magistrate Augustus’s return to the
appeal, he stated he held a pretrial conference on July 8 and determined that
the case would be bound over for trial.

Based on Magistrate Augustus’s return, Judge L. Casey Manning
ordered the case remanded to the magistrate’s court for trial.  Frierson then
sent a fax to Magistrate Womble, dated September 19, 2005, wherein she sought
to amend her pleadings to seek $500,000 in actual damages and $300,000 in
punitive damages.  She also requested the magistrate forward her case file to
the circuit court.  On October 10, 2005, Magistrate Shealy found the amendment for
additional damages would take the case outside of his jurisdiction and dismissed
Frierson’s case without prejudice so she could file in the circuit court.  Having
commenced the lawsuit on July 1, 2002, Frierson could not file the action with
the circuit court because the statute of limitations had run.

Frierson appealed the dismissal without prejudice to the circuit
court, arguing the magistrate should have transferred the case rather than
dismiss it.  Judge John C. Hayes, III, heard the appeal on April 24, 2006.  In
his order filed May 17, 2006, Judge Hayes dismissed Frierson’s appeal and found
the legislature has not granted jurisdiction to the magistrates’ courts to
transfer civil cases such as Frierson’s to the circuit court when the
magistrate no longer has jurisdiction.  This appeal follows.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Frierson
argues on appeal that the magistrate erred in not transferring her case to the
circuit court or hearing the case in its original jurisdiction in the interest
of justice.  She also argues the trial judge failed to address her right to a
jury trial and failed to address the issue of InTown’s allegedly frivolous
defense.  We affirm.Frierson’s primary
argument is that the magistrate should have transferred her case to the circuit
court rather than dismiss it without prejudice.  Frierson presents no case law
to support her position, stating instead that nothing prevents a magistrate
from sending a case to circuit court.  We note that although her argument is conclusory,
we choose to address it on the merits.

The trial court
relied upon Rock Hill Body Co. v. Rainey, 294 S.C. 426, 429, 365 S.E.2d
228, 231 (Ct. App. 1987), for the proposition that in an action with a disputed
amount in excess of the magistrate’s jurisdiction, the case “must be determined
by the circuit court in its original jurisdiction” (emphasis added).  We
agree with the trial court’s interpretation of Rainey.  Original
jurisdiction is defined as “[a] court’s power to hear and decide a
matter before any other court can review the matter.”  Black’s
Law Dictionary 856 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).

The jurisdiction
of the magistrates’ court is statutorily limited by South Carolina Code section
22-3-10 (2007).  Although we note
there are limited circumstances where the legislature has allowed magistrates
to transfer a case to the circuit court, such as when a counterclaim is filed
pursuant to South Carolina Code section 22-3-30 (2007), we believe the legislature
intentionally limited the scope of a magistrate’s power to transfer cases to
the circuit court.  In addition to Rainey, we find the statutory
guidelines that govern magistrates’ court support this view by not expressly
authorizing magistrates to transfer any type of case to the circuit court. 

Having determined
that the magistrate properly dismissed Frierson’s case once he lost
jurisdiction, we find her additional issues are moot.[2]  See Sloan v. Friends of Hunley, Inc., 369 S.C. 20, 630
S.E.2d 474 (2006) (holding a case is moot where a judgment by the court will have no practical legal
effect); McDill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 368 S.C. 29, 31, 627
S.E.2d 749, 750 (Ct. App. 2006) (“An appellate court will not pass on moot and
academic questions or make an adjudication where there remains no actual
controversy.”).

AFFIRMED.

HUFF and PIEPER, JJ., and
CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR. 

[2] Frierson did not assert on appeal that she should
have been allowed at least to proceed on her original $7,500 claim in the
magistrate’s court.