SCDOT v. Pratt

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT
BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE
268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Transportation, Respondent,

v.

James K. Pratt
and the Citizens Bank, Mortgagee, other Condemnee, Defendants, Of Whom James
K. Pratt is Appellant.

Appeal From Florence County

 Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-403

Heard June 10, 2009 – Filed August 17,
2009

AFFIRMED

Larry G. Reddeck of Lake City, for Appellant.

James C. Rushton, III, Florence, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  This
is an appeal of a jury verdict in a condemnation case.  James K. Pratt, the
landowner, contends the trial judge erred in limiting his presentation of
cost-to-cure evidence and in instructing the jury not to consider such evidence
as either an element of damages or as a criterion for the determination of damages. 
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR, and the following authorities:  S.C.
Code Ann. § 28-2-370 (2007) (allowing in a determination of just compensation
consideration of only the value of the property to be taken, any diminution in
the value of the landowner's remaining property, and any benefits of the
proposed project to the landowner); id. § 28-2-500 (stating the amount
offered by the condemnor as just compensation for a taking "is not
admissible evidence and may not be referred to at the trial"); S.C.
State Highway Dep't v. Carodale, 268 S.C. 556, 563, 235 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1977)
(affirming the trial court's charge in a just compensation proceeding that
"the compensable measure of damages was the value to the land at the date
of the taking plus any resulting injury to the remaining property offset by any
benefits to the remaining land as a result of the project"); S.C. State
Highway Dep't v. Bolt, 242 S.C. 411, 417, 131 S.E.2d 264, 267 (1963) (describing
special damages to the land remaining after a portion of the tract is condemned
as including "any damage or any decrease in actual value of the remainder
of the landowner's property which are the direct and proximate consequence of
the acquisition of the right of way"); id. at 419-20, 131 S.E.2d at
268 (affirming the trial judge's refusal to allow an aggrieved landowner to
present evidence to the jury of the cost of constructing new buildings to
replace those on the remainder property that were allegedly rendered worthless
by acquisition of the right-of-way).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.