State v. Kromah

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Miama Kromah, Appellant.

Appeal From Richland County

 James W. Johnson, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-322

Heard May 12, 2009 – Filed June 15, 2009   

AFFIRMED

Tara Shurling, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,
Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., and Solicitor Warren B
Giese; all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Miama Kromah appeals her convictions
and sentences for unlawful neglect of a child and infliction of great bodily
injury upon a child.  She argues the trial court erred in (1) permitting the State's witnesses to testify as to
the actions they took as a result of hearsay statements made by the three-year
old victim who would have been incompetent to testify at trial; (2) allowing
the State to argue during closing argument that the victim was deliberately
hidden away from the State, implying the victim would have testified Kromah
committed this crime; and (3) denying Kromah's new trial motion based on
after-discovered evidence.  We affirm.

1.  We find Kromah's argument that the trial court erred in
permitting the State's witnesses to testify unpreserved for review.  With
regards to Heather Smith's testimony, the objection did not specifically
pertain to her reliance on the victim's statements, but rather addressed the
form of the State's question.  See State v. Turner, 373 S.C. 121, 126 n.1, 644
S.E.2d 693, 696 n.1 (2007) (holding in order for an issue to be preserved for
appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial
court); State v. Johnson, 363 S.C. 53, 58, 609 S.E.2d 520, 523 (2005)
(holding an objection should be addressed to the trial court in a sufficiently
specific manner that it brings attention to the exact error).  Similarly, the objection lodged during
Investigator Roy Livingston's direct-examination did not address any alleged
hearsay statement.

2.  We find Kromah's argument that the trial court erred in
allowing the State's closing argument unpreserved for review because the
objection addressed the lack of evidence to support the State's arguments, not
the implications of the argument.  Additionally, Kromah did not make a
contemporaneous objection to the closing argument based on its insinuations.  See State
v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may
not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal."); In
the Matter of the Care & Treatment of McCracken, 346 S.C. 87, 93, 551
S.E.2d 235, 238-39 (2001) (holding the proper course is to object immediately
to an improper argument).

3.  We
find the trial court properly denied Kromah's new trial motion because the
alleged after-discovered evidence is not such that it would probably change the
result if a new trial was granted and the evidence could have been discovered
and presented during her trial.  See State v. Spann, 334 S.C.
618, 619-20, 513 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1999) (holding that in order to prevail on a
new trial motion based on after-discovered evidence, the appellant must show
the evidence:  "(1) is such that it would probably change the result if a
new trial were granted; (2) has been discovered since the trial; (3) could not
in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered prior to the trial; (4)
is material; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS,
and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.