State v. Anderson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR
RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2),
SCACR.

THE STATE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court
of Appeals

The State, Appellant,

v.

Henry M. Anderson, Jr., Respondent.

Appeal From Florence
County

Honorable
Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion
No. 2009-UP-091

Submitted
February 4, 2009 – Filed February 20, 2009

AFFIRMED AS
MODIFIED

Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,
Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia; and Solicitor E.L. Clements, III,
of Florence, for Appellant.

Henry M. Anderson, Jr., of Florence,  Pro Se,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  In this case, the State asserts the dismissal of a traffic
ticket by the magistrate court at a pretrial hearing was in error.  The circuit
court affirmed the decision of the magistrate and this appeal followed.  We
affirm as modified.[1]

1.  The gravamen of the State's argument on appeal is that based
upon the Francis Marion University (FMU) campus police officer's status as a
State Constable, the officer possessed statewide authority to issue citations
at any location in the state.  However, other than a bald assertion of
statewide authority, the campus officer's constable status was never
established before the magistrate although the officer was given an opportunity
to do so.  We question whether the issue was properly preserved by the
officer's unsupported assertion before the magistrate; however, even if we were
to consider the officer's constable commission submitted by the State for the
first time on appeal, that commission nonetheless is dated after the date of
the offense herein.  Accordingly, the officer's statewide authority was never
established.

2.  The State also contends on appeal that the circuit court
improperly applied Sections 59-116-10 et. seq. of the South
Carolina Code (2007) due to the officer's alleged status as a State Constable
at the time he issued the ticket and due to FMU's classification as a public
institution.[2] 
However, the campus officer's status as a State Constable is dispositive under
either § 23-1-60 (State Constable provision) or under § 59-116-10 et. seq. (noting § 59-116-20
specifically requires the campus police officer to be commissioned as a
constable pursuant to § 23-1-60 (State Constable provision)).  Since the
officer's status as a State Constable was never established in this record, the
circuit court's statutory interpretation of § 59-116-10 et. seq. was
unnecessary.  Accordingly, we need not resolve the statutory construction
question and thus vacate that portion of the circuit court's order.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

HEARN, C.J., and PIEPER and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] We note the circuit court's scrivener's error in
citing § 56-119-20 rather than § 59-116-20.