State v. Montgomery

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Laurtrent M.
Montgomery, Appellant.

Appeal from Lancaster County

 Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-602

Submitted September 1, 2008 – Filed
November 3, 2008

AFFIRMED

Katherine H. Hudgins, Appellate Defender, South Carolina
Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior
Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Office of the Attorney
General, of Columbia for Respondent; and Solicitor Douglas A. Barfield, Jr., of
Lancaster, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Laurtrent M. Montgomery appeals his
conviction for second-degree burglary, arguing the trial court erred in failing
to dismiss the charge on double jeopardy grounds.  We affirm.[1]

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Montgomery was accused of breaking and entering into a home and
an adjacent shed located nearby on the same property.  He was charged with
first-degree burglary for entering the house and second-degree burglary for
entering the shed.  At trial, Montgomery moved to have the second-degree
burglary charge dismissed arguing the double jeopardy clause prevented him from
receiving multiple punishments for the same offense.  Montgomery contended that
under section 16-11-10 of the South Carolina Code (2003), the house and the
shed constituted “one parcel.”  Therefore, he argued he should only be charged
with the single charge of first-degree burglary.  The trial court denied the
motion.  This appeal followed.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Montgomery argues that under section 16-11-10 of the South
Carolina Code (2003), the house and the shed constituted “one parcel.” 
Therefore, the act of breaking into the house and the shed constituted one
offense.  Under the theory of double jeopardy, he could not be given multiple
punishments for one offense.  We disagree. 

Section
16-11-10 provides:

With
respect to the crimes of burglary and arson and to all criminal offenses which
are constituted or aggravated by being committed in a dwelling house, any
house, outhouse, apartment, building, erection, shed or box in which there
sleeps a proprietor, tenant, watchman, clerk, laborer or person who lodges there
with a view to the protection of property shall be deemed a dwelling house, and
of such a dwelling house or of any other dwelling house all houses, outhouses,
buildings, sheds and erections which are within two hundred yards of it and are
appurtenant to it or to the same establishment of which it is an appurtenance
shall be deemed parcels.

To
adopt Montgomery’s interpretation of the statute strains the bounds of
reasonableness.  The statute does not indicate that a dwelling house and a shed
or other appurtenance constitute one unit with regard to the crime of
burglary.  The statue merely indicates that such appurtenances are considered
dwellings in the same manner that a house is considered a dwelling.  Therefore,
if a defendant is accused of breaking into such a structure, he can be charged
with breaking into a dwelling.

State
v. Evans, 18 S.C. 137 (1882),
discussed the former version of this statute which made appurtenant structures “dwellings.” 
The supreme court stated that the “statute was intended to enlarge the field
within which burglary could be committed.”  Id.  That seems to be the
consistent purpose of treating sheds, garages, porches and other appurtenant
structures as dwellings.  There is no indication in the current statute to
suggest the legislature meant to somehow contract the field within which
burglary may be committed by making nearby structures and homes one indivisible
unit.

  
Furthermore, section 16-11-310 of the South Carolina Code (2003) states that
“[w]here a building consists of two or more units separately occupied or
secured, each unit is deemed both a separate building in itself and a part of
the main building.”  Under this statute, a single building can be the site of
multiple burglaries provided there are separately secured units within the
building.  If that is the case, it would be illogical to assume section
16-11-10 intended to make two free-standing, separately-secured structures a
single building for purposes of the burglary statute.

Based
on all of the foregoing, the ruling of the trial court is

AFFIRMED.

Anderson, Williams,
and Konduros, JJ., concur.

[1] This case was decided without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.