DeWitt v. Charleston Gas Light, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Merrill DeWitt, Respondent,

v.

Charleston Gas Light, Inc. and Debra M. McKinley,
Individually and d/b/a Charleston Gas Light, Inc., Defendants,

Of Whom
Charleston Gas Light, Inc. is the Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County

 Thomas L. Hughston, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-607

Submitted November 3, 2008 – Filed
November 6, 2008

AFFIRMED

Allan R. Holmes, of Charleston, for Appellant.

Alan D. Toporek, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  In this breach of
employment contract action, Debra McKinley argues the trial court erred in
failing to grant her motion for directed verdict based on her good faith belief
that cause existed to terminate Merrill DeWitt’s employment.  Additionally,
McKinley argues she should be afforded a new trial, and she contends a rule
requiring only a good faith belief in cause for termination should apply to all
employment contracts, not only unilateral contracts.  We affirm pursuant to
Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.  As to the
question of whether the trial court erred in denying McKinley’s motions for directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV):  McMillan v. Oconee Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 367 S.C. 559, 564, 626 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2006) and Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc., 355 S.C. 316, 320, 585 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2003)
(both holding when reviewing a circuit
court’s ruling on a directed verdict or JNOV, this court will reverse the
ruling only when no evidence supports the ruling); Connor v. City of Forest Acres, 348 S.C. 454, 464, 560 S.E.2d 606, 611 (2002)
(“The appropriate test on the issue of breach is as follows: If the fact
finder finds a contract to terminate only for cause, he must determine
whether the employer had a reasonable good faith belief that sufficient
cause existed for termination.”) (internal quotations omitted) (first emphasis
added).

2.  As to whether
the trial court erred in denying McKinley’s request for a new trial based on
the jurors’ failure to comply with the trial court’s jury instructions:  In
re Michael H., 360 S.C. 540, 546, 602 S.E.2d 729, 732 (2004) (“An issue may
not be raised for the first time on appeal.  In order to preserve an issue for
appeal, it must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court.”); Lucas v.
Rawl Family Ltd. P’ship, 359 S.C. 505, 510-11, 598 S.E.2d 712, 715 (2004)
(“It is well settled that, but for a very few exceptional circumstances, an
appellate court cannot address an issue unless it was raised to and ruled upon
by the trial court.”). 

3. 
As to whether the rule requiring only a reasonable good faith belief in cause
for termination should apply to all employment contracts, not just unilateral
contracts:  In re Michael H., 360 S.C. at 546, 602 S.E.2d at 732 (“An
issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal.  In order to preserve an
issue for appeal, it must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court.”); Lucas
v. Rawl Family Ltd. P’ship, 359 S.C. at 510-11, 598 S.E.2d at 715 (“It is
well settled that, but for a very few exceptional circumstances, an appellate
court cannot address an issue unless it was raised to and ruled upon by the
trial court.”).

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON, HUFF, and
THOMAS, JJ., concur.