State v. Scroggins

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Larontae
Scroggins, Appellant.

Appeal From Lexington County

 R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-428

Submitted June 2, 2008 – Filed July 23,
2008

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Attorney for Capital Appeals Robert M. Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,
Special Assistant Attorney General, Amie L. Clifford, all of Columbia; and
Solicitor Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Larontae
Scroggins appeals his convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a violent crime.  On appeal, Scroggins argues the trial
court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence from an out-of-court
statement made by a non-testifying witness on redirect examination where the statement
was prejudicial hearsay.  We affirm.[1] 

At trial, the State called Yuri McLamore, Detective Eric Russell,
and Officer Donall Stoudemire to testify.  Renee Mullinax, the individual
allegedly kidnapped by Scroggins, was not called as a witness at trial.  During
cross-examination of Detective Russell, Scroggins’ counsel questioned Detective
Russell about statements Mullinax made to police regarding events following the
robbery, which were recorded in Detective Russell’s report of the case. 
Specifically, Scroggins’ counsel asked Detective Russell about Mullinax’s
statements whereby she admitted to having consensual sex with Scroggins
following the alleged robbery.  Following this line of questioning, the State
raised the issue of whether Scroggins’ counsel had, by questioning Detective
Russell about Mullinax’s statement, opened the door to inquiry of other
statements made by Mullinax to Detective Russell about the events of the
robbery.  The trial court ruled that Scroggins’ counsel had opened the door.

Accordingly, during the redirect examination of Detective Russell,
the State inquired about statements Mullinax made about the robbery.  When
asked specifically what Mullinax had to say about the robbery, Scroggins’
counsel objected arguing the line of questioning was based on hearsay.  The
trial court overruled the objection and Detective Russell proceeded with his
testimony.

Scroggins asserts the trial court erred in allowing the State to
introduce hearsay testimony of Mullinax’s statement to Detective Russell
regarding the robbery.  Scroggins further asserts the statements were
prejudicial because they confirmed McLamore’s testimony regarding the events
surrounding the robbery, and, in particular, the presence of the gun.  We find
the circuit court did not commit reversible error.  See State v. McFarlane, 279 S.C. 327, 330, 306 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1983) (“It is well settled
that the admission of improper evidence is harmless where it is merely
cumulative to other evidence.”); State v. Schumpert, 312 S.C. 502, 507,
435 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1993) (any error in admission of evidence cumulative to
other unobjected-to evidence is harmless). 

Even if the door had not
been opened and the trial court erred in allowing the admission of the
testimony at issue, we find the error to be harmless.  Since McLamore testified
earlier in the trial that Scroggins had robbed him at gunpoint and took
Mullinax at gunpoint against her will, the disputed testimony by Detective
Russell is merely cumulative.  Moreover, Detective Russell testified, without
objection, that Mullinax’s account of the events confirmed what McLamore had
stated.  This testimony by Detective Russell was placed into evidence before
the disputed testimony at issue herein.  Since McLamore testified first,
followed by Detective Russell’s testimony without objection that Mullinax
confirmed what McLamore stated, the subsequent admission by the court of other
statements by Mullinax through Detective Russell was therefore harmless even if
the admission was in error. 

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS,
and PIEPER, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.