Persons v. SCDMV

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT
BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE
239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Anne T.
Persons, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, Henry McMaster, in
his official capacity as the Attorney General of the state of South Carolina,
and the State of South Carolina, Defendants,

of whom South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles is Respondent.

Appeal From Richland County

James R. Barber, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-322

Heard June 6, 2008 - Filed June 27, 2008 

Withdrawn and Substituted September 4,
2008   

AFFIRMED

Desa Ballard and P. Christopher Smith, Jr., of West Columbia, for
Appellant.

Frank L. Valenta, Jr., and Philip S. Porter, of Blythewood, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Anne
T. Persons (Persons) argues the circuit court erred in finding no legal
conflict exists between the administrative stay provisions of South Carolina Code
Ann. sections 56-1-365(F) and 56-1-430 (2006), which govern the suspension of a
driver’s license, and the criminal stay provision of South Carolina Code Ann. section
18-1-70 (1976), which governs the execution of a judicially-imposed criminal
sentence.

We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Price, 333 S.C. 267, 271-72, 510 S.E.2d 215, 218
(1998) (stating suspension of a license is non-punitive and non-criminal in
nature and does not constitute a criminal penalty for purposes of double
jeopardy); Yeargin v. S.C. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 313
S.C. 387, 390, 438 S.E.2d 234, 235 (1993) (explaining suspension of a license
following a conviction for driving under the influence is not considered part
of the punishment for the offense and recognizing mandatory revocation of a
driver’s license without an administrative hearing does not violate due process
when there has been a prior hearing and conviction on the criminal charge
causing the revocation); Brewer v. S.C. Highway Dep’t, 261 S.C. 52, 57,
198 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1973) (holding the
administrative suspension of a license is “a forfeiture of the privilege to
drive”); Parker v. State Highway Dep’t, 224 S.C. 263, 271, 78 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1953)
(holding a driver’s license suspension is not part of the punishment fixed by
the court, nor is it an added punishment for the criminal offense committed, as
it is civil and not criminal in nature); Taylor v. S.C. Dep’t
of Motor Vehicles, 368 S.C. 33, 36,
627 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Ct. App. 2006) cert. granted, (Aug. 9, 2007)
(citing Sponar v. S.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 361 S.C. 35, 39, 603 S.E.2d
412, 415 (Ct. App. 2004)) (holding a driver’s license is not a property right
but is a mere privilege subject to reasonable regulations in the interest of public safety and welfare); Page v. S.C. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 329 S.C. 166, 169,
495 S.E.2d 220, 222 (Ct. App. 1997) (implicitly holding administrative
suspensions are independent of criminal sentences); see also S.C. Code
Ann. § 56-1-300 (2006) (stating the Department of Motor Vehicles may suspend or
revoke a driver’s license without a preliminary hearing when records or other
sufficient evidence demonstrates the licensee has been convicted of an offense
requiring mandatory revocation or suspension upon conviction); S.C. Code Ann. §
56-1-400 (2006 & Supp. 2007) (indicating the purely administrative nature
of a driver’s license suspension and restoration by stating “[t]he Department
of Motor Vehicles, upon suspending or revoking a license, shall require that
such license shall be surrendered to the Department of Motor Vehicles” and “[t]he
Department of Motor Vehicles shall not . . . restore a license which has been
suspended for . . . driving under the influence of intoxicants . . . until the
person has filed an application for a new license, submitted to an examination
as upon an original application, and has satisfied the Department of Motor
Vehicles . . . that it would be safe to grant [the licensee] the privilege of
driving a motor vehicle on the public highways”).

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.