Butts v. C.R. England Trucking

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

William Butts, Appellant,

v.

C.R. England
Trucking and Cambridge Integrated Services Group Inc., Defendants,

Of Whom C.R.
England Trucking is the
Respondent.

Appeal From Colleton County

 John C. Few, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2008-UP-064

Heard December 11, 2007 – Filed January
22, 2008

REVERSED AND REMANDED

E. Courtney Gruber and R. Walter Hundley, both of Charleston, for
Appellant.

Clarke W. McCants, III, of Aiken, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: 
William Butts appeals a circuit court order affirming the South Carolina
Workers’ Compensation Commission’s determination that Butts was not totally and
permanently disabled after suffering a work-related injury.  The essence of
Butts’ appeal is that the combined
effects of his pre-existing psychological condition and his subsequent injury
resulted in a greater disability than he would have experienced from the injury
alone, resulting in his inability to work and complete disability under S.C.
Code Ann. § 42-9-400 (1985 & Supp. 2006).  In light of the recent decision
from our supreme court in Ellison v. Frigidaire Home Products, 371 S.C.
159, 638 S.E.2d 664 (2006), we agree with Butts that the Commission imposed an
inappropriate legal standard in evaluating the effects and relationship of his
pre-existing injury to his subsequent work-related injury.  Accordingly, we reverse
and remand to the circuit court, which shall remand the matter to the
Commission with instructions to consider Butts’ claim under the Ellison standard. 

I.

William
Butts sustained an admitted workers’ compensation injury to his lower back on
November 7, 2000 while working for C.R. England Trucking as a truck driver. 
According to Butts, he heard a snap in his back when he picked up a pallet
while working on a long-distance trucking assignment.  England Trucking paid
some of Butts’ medical bills and also paid him temporary compensation for the
back injury.  Butts thereafter contended his back injury aggravated his
pre-existing psychological condition of post-traumatic stress disorder.[1] 
Butts alleged he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the
combined effects of his accident and psychological condition and sought
lifetime medical benefits.   

In an order filed
March 4, 2003, the single commissioner found Butts had lost more than fifty
percent of the use of his back as a result of the accident, in combination with
his pre-existing arthritis, and that the accident had aggravated his
pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder.  The single commissioner found
Butts was permanently and totally disabled and ruled he was entitled to
lifetime medical benefits. 

England Trucking
sought review of the single commissioner’s order by the Commission.  In a
decision filed January 13, 2004, the Commission found Butts had suffered an
injury to his lower back, but reversed the single commissioner’s determination
that the injury resulted in the aggravation of a pre-existing psychological
condition.  The Commission found Butts was entitled to compensation for a ten
percent, permanent, partial disability to his lower back as a result of the
accident.    

Butts appealed to the circuit court, which remanded
the matter to the Commission “to state with specificity the evidence upon which
its decision is based.”  The circuit court stated there was evidence in the
record which “clearly” supported the original finding of the single
commissioner that Butts suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, which
“both pre-existed and was aggravated by the work-related accident.”  The circuit
court observed that neither England Trucking nor the Commission had cited to
any specific medical evidence to support the findings of the Commission
regarding Butts’ claim.    

Upon
remand, the Commission issued an order filed March 15, 2005 that more fully set
forth the reasons for its decision.  The Commission found Butts sustained an
injury to his back as a result of a work-related accident, but that Butts “did
not sustain any other permanent injury to any other part of his body as a
result of the accident . . . and did not sustain any psychological injury, or
aggravation to a pre-existing psychological condition as a result of said
accident.”  The Commission further found that Butts “suffered from significant
psychological and physical problems which existed before the accident in this
case” and “that any inability of [Butts] to engage in any employment activities
is not due to any injury sustained by him while working for [England
Trucking].”   

The
Commission awarded Butts benefits for a ten percent, permanent, partial
disability to his lower back pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-30 (1985 &
Supp. 2006), the scheduled injury statute, and authorized payment for all
causally related and authorized medical treatment for the injury to his lower
back.  Butts sought a review of this decision.  The circuit court, with a
different judge presiding, upheld the decision of the Commission by order filed
July 20, 2006.  Butts appeals.

II.

In this case we are presented with conflicting views
on the appropriate scope of review.  Butts contends the Commission applied the
wrong legal standard in denying his claim that he was totally disabled.  He
further contends the circuit court improperly found substantial evidence
supported the Commission’s determination because application of the wrong legal
standard affected the Commission’s determination.  In contrast, England
Trucking argues the Commission’s fact-based determination should not be
reversed because it is supported by substantial evidence. 

The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA) establishes
the standard for judicial review of decisions of the Commission.  West v. Alliance Capital, 368 S.C. 246, 628 S.E.2d 279 (Ct. App. 2006).  Under the APA, an appellate court may reverse or modify the
decision of the agency if the agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are affected by an error of law or are clearly erroneous in view of
the substantial evidence in the whole record.  Id.; see also S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2006).  Substantial evidence is evidence that,
considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the
conclusion reached by the Commission.  Rodney v. Michelin Tire Corp.,
320 S.C. 515, 466 S.E.2d 357 (1996).  The possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not mean the agency’s conclusion is
unsupported by substantial evidence.  Ellis v. Spartan Mills, 276 S.C.
216, 277 S.E.2d 590 (1981).

“Conversely,
where the Commission’s decision is controlled by an error of law, this court’s
review is plenary.”  Lizee v. South Carolina Dep’t of Mental Health, 367
S.C. 122, 126, 623 S.E.2d 860, 862 (Ct. App. 2005).  An appellate court
may reverse the Commission when its decision is affected by an error of law.  Callahan
v. Beaufort County Sch. Dist., 375 S.C. 92, 651 S.E.2d
311 (2007).

III.

On appeal, Butts contends the circuit court erred in
ruling there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s findings (1)
that Butts did not sustain a psychological injury or the aggravation of a
pre-existing psychological problem as a result of his work-related accident,
and (2) that Butts’ inability to sustain gainful employment was not due to any
work-related injury.  He further asserts the combined effects of his
pre-existing psychological condition and his subsequent injury resulted in a
greater disability than he would have experienced from the injury alone,
resulting in his inability to work and complete disability under the legal
standard recently set forth in Ellison v. Frigidaire Home Products, 371
S.C. 159, 638 S.E.2d 664 (2006).  He asserts the application of an
inappropriate legal standard affected the Commission’s determination and thus
constituted an error of law.

In reversing the single commissioner’s award, the Commission
stated records from the Department of Veteran Affairs noted Butts had “reported
symptoms of PTSD, including depression, loss of sleep, loss of interest in
pleasurable things, loss of energy, loss of concentration, increased appetite
and suicidal ideation, and that he ‘has been getting progressively worse for
roughly four years.’”  The Commission observed this note was prepared two weeks
after Butts’ injury and makes no reference to any physical injury he sustained
while working for his employer. 

The Commission also
noted Dr. E. Selman Watson, who evaluated Butts at the request of England
Trucking, had found Butts’ emotional condition followed a slow and insidious
course that had been building before the accident.  The Commission stated, “Dr.
Watson is further of the opinion that while the accident may have contributed
to the Claimant’s decline, other medical ailments suffered by the Claimant, and
which pre-date the accident involved here, may have also served to threaten his
livelihood.”    

The circuit court
summarily noted “there is strong evidence to support the Commission’s finding[]
that [Butts’] pre[-]existing psychological condition was not aggravated by the
injury to his lower back.”  The circuit court stated there was evidence cited
by the Commission that Butts suffered from psychological and physical problems
prior to his accident and that he had applied for work since the date of his
accident.     

On appeal Butts cites Ellison, in which our
supreme court held “[t]here is no requirement that the pre-existing condition
aggravated the injury, or that the injury aggravated the pre-existing
condition, so long as there is a greater disability simply from the ‘combined
effects’ of the injury and the pre-existing condition.”  371 S.C at 164, 638
S.E.2d at 666.  In that case, Ellison fractured his leg, causing a twenty
percent disability.  Id. at 161, 638 S.E.2d at 665.  The court held
Ellison’s pre-existing physical conditions, including hypertension, sleep
apnea, prostate cancer, diabetes, and congestive cardiac disease, were properly
considered to determine that Ellison was entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits because he was physically unable to work after his
accident.  Id. 

Our
supreme court further noted in Ellison that the proper section to apply
was not the scheduled injury statute found at S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-30 (1985
& Supp. 2006), but rather, the general disability statute, id. §
42-9-400(a) (1985), which provides in pertinent part as follows: 

If an employee who has a permanent physical impairment
from any cause or origin incurs a subsequent disability from injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, resulting in compensation
and medical payments liability or either, for disability that is
substantially greater, by reason of the combined effects of the preexisting
impairment and subsequent injury or by reason of the aggravation of the
preexisting impairment, than that which would have resulted from the subsequent
injury alone, the employer or his insurance carrier shall in the first
instance pay all awards of compensation and medical benefits provided by this
Title; but such employer or his insurance carrier shall be reimbursed from the
Second Injury Fund . . . .  (Emphasis added.)[2]

Relying
upon Ellison, Butts contends the Commission’s “finding that [he] did not
suffer any psychological injury or aggravation of a pre[-]existing
psychological problem as a result of [his work-related] accident . . . was not
supported by the substantial evidence in the record.”  He further contends
that, “to the extent . . . the . . . findings are predicated upon a requirement
that the pre[-]existing condition have been aggravated by the work-related
accident, those findings are erroneous as a matter of law, in that they are not
consistent with the [South Carolina] Supreme Court holding in Ellison v. Frigidaire
Home Products.”     

Butts
further asserts that “[t]he substantial evidence in
the record supports a finding that [he] sustained a physical injury as a result
of a work-related accident which, when combined with the pre[-]existing mental
illness, rendered him incapable of continuing to work as a long distance truck
driver, and therefore, rendered him permanently incapable of performing gainful
employment.”  England Trucking presents a different take on the
evidence and argues application of the Ellison standard does not affect
the result reached by the Commission because “[t]he substantial evidence here
shows that the injury to Mr. Butts’ lower back did not combine with, or
aggravate, his PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder] to cause any disability. 
The Commission found that the evidence shows Mr. Butts’ inability to work, if
any, is caused solely by that non-work related condition.”    

We do agree with Butts that the Commission erred in not following
the Ellison standard.  We, however, decline to reach the ultimate merits
of Butts’ position under the Ellison standard.  We believe in the first instance that the Commission should be given
the opportunity to assess and weigh the evidence under the proper legal
standard.     

As
noted above, the court in Ellison held it is not necessary that the new
injury aggravate the pre-existing condition; rather, it is enough if the combined
effects of the new injury and the pre-existing condition result in a
greater disability to the claimant.  In the current appeal, neither the
Commission nor the circuit court had the benefit of Ellison at the time
their decisions were rendered and they did not apply this legal standard.[3] 
Rather, they seemed to focus on the fact that Butts suffered from a
pre-existing impairment that allegedly was not exacerbated by the subsequent
accident, which is not the standard in Ellison.

As a
result, we reverse and remand this case to the circuit court, which shall send
the case back to the Commission with instructions that the Commission consider,
on the existing record, Butts’ claim under the Ellison standard. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the order on appeal is

REVERSED
AND REMANDED.

HEARN,
C.J., and KITTREDGE and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

[1] Butts reportedly acquired this condition as a result
of his service in Vietnam.  He first received treatment for this stress
condition in September 2000. 

[2]  Section 42-9-400(a) was recently amended, but the change
does not affect this appeal as it applies only to injuries occurring on or
after July 1, 2007.  The amendment eliminated the language regarding the
combined effects.  The statute now provides in relevant part:  “If an employee
who has a permanent physical impairment from any cause or origin incurs a
subsequent disability from injury by accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment, resulting in compensation and medical payments liability or
either, for disability that is substantially greater and is caused by
aggravation of the preexisting impairment than that which would have
resulted from the subsequent injury alone, the employer or his insurance
carrier shall pay all awards of compensation and medical benefits provided by
this title . . . .”  2007 Act No. 111, Pt. II, § 3 (emphasis added).  We do not
reach the question whether Ellison has been effectively overruled by
2007 Act No. 111.  However, since the change applies only to injuries occurring
on or after July 1, 2007, the current appeal must be decided under the version
of section 42-9-400 that was applicable at the time of Butts’ injury, which is
the same version of the statute that was applied in Ellison.

[3]  Ellison was issued on November 20, 2006; the
Commission’s order was filed on March 15, 2005 and the circuit court’s
order was filed on July 20, 2006.  Ellison does not represent new law,
but is simply a matter of statutory interpretation.