SCDOR v. American Legion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD
NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of
Revenue, Respondent,

v.
James Leroy Belk Post 17,
American Legion, d/b/a
Waccamaw Bingo, and Stephen
L. Johnson, Promoter, Appellants.

__________

Appeal From the Administrative Law Court
John D. McLeod, Administrative Law Court Judge
__________

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-359
Submitted May 1, 2012 – Filed June 13, 2012
__________

AFFIRMED
__________

Kenneth R. Young Jr., of Sumter, for Appellants.

Amelia Furr Ruple, Harry A. Hancock, and Milton G.
Kimpson, all of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: James Leroy Belk Post 17, American Legion
(American Legion) and Stephen L. Johnson appeal the Administrative Law
Court's (ALC) decision finding them in violation of section 12-21-4090(C) of
the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011) and fining Johnson $1,000. The
appellants argue the ALC abused its discretion in reaching its decision. We
affirm.1

We find the ALC did not abuse its discretion in finding American
Legion and Johnson violated section 12-21-4090(C). The statute is clear in
requiring "both the organization and promoter [to] deposit a loan equal to
fifty percent of the deficit." S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-4090(C) (Supp. 2011);
see also Kennedy v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 345 S.C. 339, 346, 549 S.E.2d 243, 246
(2001) ("The first question of statutory interpretation is whether the statute's
meaning is clear on its face. If a statute's language is plain and unambiguous,
and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing
rules of statutory interpretation and the court has no right to look for or
impose another meaning." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, it was
undisputed that Johnson alone made the deposits into the account. Also,
evidence supports the ALC's determination that testimony about the
purported loan between Johnson and American Legion lacks credibility.
Further, we find section 12-21-4090(C) is not unconstitutionally vague
because "men of common intelligence" would not need to guess about what
the statute means or how to apply it. See Toussaint v. State Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs, 303 S.C. 316, 320, 400 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1991) ("A law is
unconstitutionally vague if it forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its
meaning and differ as to its application.").

We also find the ALC did not abuse its discretion in imposing a fine on
Johnson. Contrary to Johnson's assertion, the ALC fined him $1,000, not
$2,000. Because Johnson argues his fine should not exceed $1,500, this issue
needs no further consideration. Accordingly, the ALC's decision is

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.