Southern Bank v. Bruce

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Southern Bank, Appellant,

v.

Leeroy Bruce
Jr., Franklin Harold Mishoe, and SRP Federal Credit Union, Respondents.

Appeal From Edgefield County

William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-304

Submitted May 1, 2012 – Filed May 16, 2012   

AFFIRMED

Michael S. Medlock, of Edgefield, for
Appellant.

James S. Murray, of Augusta, and Franklin
H. Mishoe, pro se, of North Augusta, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Southern Bank (Bank) appeals the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of SRP Federal Credit Union (Union),
arguing  the trial court erred in finding
that Bank's security interest became subordinate to Union's security interest
in a 1964 Chevrolet Malibu pursuant to section 36-9-337 of the South Carolina
Code (2003).  We affirm.[1]

"An appellate court
reviews the grant of summary judgment under the same standard applied by the
[trial] court."  Harbit v. City of Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 389,
675 S.E.2d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2009).  The trial court should grant summary
judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law."  Rule 56(c), SCRCP.  "In determining
whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable
inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party."  Harbit, 382 S.C. at 389-90, 675 S.E.2d at 779. 

Section 36-9-337 of the South
Carolina Code (2003) provides:

If, while a security interest in goods is perfected by any method
under the law of another jurisdiction, this [s]tate issues a certificate of
title that does not show that the goods are subject to the security interest or
contain a statement that they may be subject to security interests not shown on
the certificate:

. . .

(2) the security interest is subordinate to a conflicting security
interest in the goods that attaches, and is perfected under [s]ection 36-9-311(b), after issuance of the certificate and without the
conflicting secured party's knowledge of the security interest.

Here, Union presented
evidence it acquired and perfected its security interest in the car without
knowledge of Bank's claimed security interest in the car in its verified
pleadings and at the motion hearing.  While Bank argues Union had knowledge of
Bank's security interest, Bank presented no evidence in its pleadings,
affidavits, or exhibits nor made any arguments at the motion hearing to support
such contention.  Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Union's motion
for summary judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact
whether Union knew or had reason to know about Bank's security interest. 

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and
LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.