Molnar v. Warren

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Lynda Molnar, Plaintiff,

v.

Piri Molnar and
Phillip Warren, Individually and as the General Partners of Peaches Auto
Sales, Defendants.

Of whom, Lynda
Molnar and Piri Molnar are, Respondents,

v.

Philip Warren, Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County

Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-237

Heard April 11, 2012 – Filed April 25,
2012 

AFFIRMED

Ryan L. Beasley and Ransome H. Helmly, both
of Greenville, for Appellant.

David S. Wyatt and Ralph L. Gleaton, II,
both of Greenville, for Respondents. 

PER CURIAM:  This appeal arises from a jury verdict awarding
Plaintiff-Respondent Lynda Molnar $90,000 in damages on an action for breach of
contract against Defendant-Appellant Phillip Warren and Defendant-Respondent
Piri Molnar, both individually and as the general partners of Peaches Auto
Sales.  On appeal, Warren argues the trial court erred by (1) denying his
motion for a directed verdict; (2) denying his motion for summary judgment; (3)
failing to charge the jury on the statute of limitations; (4) denying his
motion to amend the pleadings; and (5) denying his motion to subtract $28,000
from the judgment.  We affirm pursuant
to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to
whether the trial court erred by denying Warren's motion for directed verdict:  Fettler v. Gentner, 396 S.C. 461, 466, 722 S.E.2d 26, 29 (Ct. App. 2012)
(providing that an appellate court is required to view the evidence and
inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party when reviewing the denial of a motion for
directed verdict); id. ("'An appellate court will only reverse the
[trial] court's ruling when there is no evidence to support the ruling or when
the ruling is controlled by an error of law.'" (citation omitted)).

2. As to
whether the trial court erred by denying Warren's motion for summary judgment:  Mowrer v. Charleston Cnty. Park & Recreation Comm'n, 361 S.C. 476,
483, 605 S.E.2d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The denial of summary judgment
is not appealable, even after final judgment . . . ."  (citation
omitted)). 

3.  As to
whether the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on the statute of
limitations:  Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 385 S.C. 344, 351, 683
S.E.2d 818, 822 (Ct. App. 2009) ("To warrant reversal, the party seeking
the requested jury charge must demonstrate error and prejudice." (citation
omitted)); Wolfe v. Brannon, 211 S.C. 282, 286, 44 S.E.2d 833, 835
(1947) ("A payment proved to have been made by the maker of a promissory
note after it has become barred by the statute of limitations is equivalent to
a promise in writing by the maker to pay the debt, upon which action may be brought
at any time within [three] years after such payment."); Zaks v. Elliott,
106 F.2d 425, 427 (4th Cir. 1939) ("It is established in South Carolina
that partial payment on a note within the [statutory] period immediately
preceding the bringing of an action therein will remove the bar of the
statute." (citation omitted)).

4.  As to
whether the trial court erred by denying Warren's motion to amend the pleadings: 
Rule 15(a), SCRCP (providing that when more than thirty days have passed since
a responsive pleading is served, "a party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires and does not prejudice any other party"); Hale v. Finn, 388 S.C. 79, 87-88, 694 S.E.2d 51, 56 (Ct. App. 2010)
("Courts have wide latitude in amending pleadings and, while this power
should not be exercised indiscriminately or to surprise or prejudice an
opposing party, the matter of allowing amendments is left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Collins
Entm't, Inc. v. White, 363 S.C. 546, 562, 611 S.E.2d 262, 270 (Ct. App.
2005) (finding the prejudice that the civil procedure rules envision, as would
warrant denial of a motion to amend the pleadings, is a lack of notice that the
new issue is to be tried and a lack of opportunity to refute it).

5. As to
whether the trial court erred by denying Warren's motion to subtract $28,000
from the judgment:  Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 35, 640 S.E.2d 486, 505
(Ct. App. 2006) (providing the jury's determination of damages is entitled to
substantial deference and compelling reasons must exist to justify the trial
court invading the jury's province by granting a new trial to adjust damages
(citation omitted)); Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 403, 477 S.E.2d
715, 722 (1996) (providing a trial court's decision to uphold a jury's verdict
will not be disturbed on appeal unless such decision is wholly unsupported by
evidence or controlled by an error of law (citation omitted)). 

AFFIRMED.

PIEPER,
KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.