Ellison v. Brown

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Nellie Ellison,
Individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Kashawn R., Keshawn R., and Kevin
R., Appellants,

v.

Rudolph Brown, Respondent.

Appeal From Marion County

Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-174 

Heard February 15, 2012 – Filed March 14,
2012

AFFIRMED

H. Thad White, Jr., of Florence, for
Appellants.

R. Hawthorne Barrett, of Columbia; and R.
Heath Atkinson, of Florence, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Nellie
Ellison, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Kashawn R., Keshawn R., and
Kevin R. (collectively, Appellants) appeal a jury verdict finding Rudolph Brown
not liable for injuries they sustained when their car was rear-ended by Mr.
Brown's car.  Appellants raise two arguments on appeal.  We affirm.

1. Appellants argue the
trial court erred in permitting the reading and admission of Dr. T. Rhett
Spencer, Jr.'s deposition because Dr. Spencer's testimony failed to satisfy the
"most probably" rule.  However, Appellants objected only after subsequent
questioning and the conclusion of direct examination.  Therefore, this issue is
unpreserved.  See Lindsey v. City of Greenville, 247 S.C.
232, 240-41, 146 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1966) (holding the trial court properly
overruled an objection for failure to be timely raised because it challenged
testimony introduced during direct examination and was not raised until after
the expert's direct examination had concluded); Holroyd v. Requa, 361
S.C. 43, 60, 603 S.E.2d 417, 426 (Ct. App. 2004) (cert. granted) ("Failure
to object to the introduction of evidence at the time the evidence is offered
constitutes a waiver of the right to have the issue considered on appeal.").

2.  Appellants argue the trial court erred in denying
their motion for a new trial based upon certain assertions made during Mr.
Brown's closing argument.  However, Appellants did not object during any
portion of Mr. Brown's closing argument.  Moreover, their post-trial motion
only challenged the assertions that Mr. Brown's estate and widow would pay the
jury's verdict, and these assertions do not constitute abuse of a party or
witness.  Therefore, this issue is unpreserved.  See Dial v. Niggel
Assocs., Inc., 333 S.C. 253, 256-57, 509 S.E.2d 269, 270-71 (1998)
(providing that the failure to make a contemporaneous objection to an improper closing
argument waives any challenge to the argument unless the closing argument
"constitutes abuse of a party or witness" and the complained of argument
was raised by post-trial motion).

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS,
THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.