State v. Dixon

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Clastimile
Dixon, Appellant.

Appeal From Darlington County

Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-072

Submitted January 3, 2012 – Filed February
8, 2012

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Tristan M. Shaffer, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of
Columbia; and Solicitor William B. Rogers, Jr., of Bennettsville, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Clastimile
Dixon appeals his convictions for distribution of crack cocaine and
distribution of crack cocaine within one half mile radius of a school, arguing
the trial court erred in allowing a lay witness to give his opinion about the
reason for not routinely testing crack cocaine for DNA and fingerprints.  We affirm.[1]

"The admission or
exclusion of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a manifest
abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice."  State v. Wise,
359 S.C. 14, 21, 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004).  A lay witness's testimony in the
form of an opinion or inference is admissible only if (a) it is
"rationally based on the perception of the witness," (b) it is
"helpful to a clear understanding of the witness'[s] testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue," and (c) it does "not require
special knowledge, skill, experience or training."  Rule 701, SCRE. 
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 
Rule 702, SCRE.

"[A]n insubstantial
error not affecting the result of the trial is harmless where guilt has been conclusively proven by competent
evidence such that no other rational conclusion can be reached."  State
v. Price, 368 S.C. 494, 499, 629 S.E.2d 363, 366 (2006).  "Whether an error in the admission of evidence is harmless
generally depends upon its materiality in relation to the case as a
whole."  State v. Haselden, 353 S.C. 190, 196, 577 S.E.2d 445, 448
(2003).  "Where a review of the entire record
establishes the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction
should not be reversed."  Price, 368 S.C. at 499, 629 S.E.2d at
366.

We find the trial court
improperly admitted Deputy Russ Harrell's opinion testimony, which indicated
that testing crack cocaine for fingerprints or DNA would have destroyed the integrity
of the evidence.  His opinion required special knowledge of the effect of a wet
cotton swab on crack cocaine or of introducing some other foreign substance
into the crack cocaine.  Deputy Harrell would have acquired this knowledge
through his job as a forensic investigator.  Deputy Harrell was not testifying
as an expert.  Thus, his testimony in the form of opinion was restricted.  See Rule 701, SCRE (restricting the admissibility of a lay witness's opinion if it
requires special knowledge, skill, experience, or training). 

However, competent evidence
proving Dixon's guilt was introduced at trial: the videotape, the still
pictures, the testimony of the confidential informant and her identification of
Dixon, and the testimony of the officers identifying Dixon on the videotape and
in the still pictures.  Therefore, the admission of Deputy Harrell's testimony
was harmless.  See Price, 368 S.C. at 499, 629 S.E.2d at 366 ("[A]n
insubstantial error not affecting the result of the trial is harmless where guilt has been conclusively proven by
competent evidence such that no other rational conclusion can be
reached."). 

Additionally, Deputy
Brad Lawson testified without objection that fingerprinting the crack cocaine
or obtaining DNA off of it in this case would have been unnecessary as the
perpetrator was known and the procedure did not require taking these measures.  Accordingly, Detective
Harrell's objectionable testimony had a minimal impact in the context of the
entire record.  See Haselden, 353 S.C. at 196, 577 S.E.2d at 448 ("Whether an error in the admission of evidence
is harmless generally depends upon its materiality in relation to the case as a
whole."). 

Therefore, the trial court's
improper admission of Deputy Harrell's testimony is not reversible error. 

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS and
GEATHERS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.