SCDSS v. James G.

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Social Services, Respondent,

v.

Sandra G.,
James G., Frederick Y., Defendants,

Of whom James
G. is the Appellant.

In the
interest of a minor under the age of 18 years.

Appeal From York County

Alex Kinlaw, Jr., Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-052

Submitted January 2, 2012 – Filed January
25, 2012   

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED

Thomas F. McDow and Erin K. Urquhart, both of Rock Hill, for
Appellant.

Adrienne Woods, of Rock Hill, for Respondent.

Rosalee Hix Davis, of Lancaster, for
Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: James
G. (Stepfather) appeals the family court's order finding he abused his wife's
(Mother) minor child (Child), ordering that his name be placed on the Central
Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect, and ordering him to pay child support. 
Stepfather argues the family court erred in (1) finding he abused Child, (2)
ordering that his name be placed on the Central Registry of Child Abuse and
Neglect, (3) ordering him to pay child support for Child, (4) relying on the
Guardian ad Litem's (GAL) report when the GAL did not appear at trial or sign
the report, and (5) issuing an order that failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 26(a), SCRFC.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. As to whether the family
court erred in finding Stepfather abused Child, we affirm. 

"In appeals from the
family court, the appellate court has the authority to find the facts in
accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence."  Ex
parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56, 61, 624 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2006).  "This
broad scope of review does not, however, require the appellate court to
disregard the findings of the family court."  Id. 
"This degree of deference is especially true in cases involving the
welfare and best interests of a minor child."  Id. at 62, 624
S.E.2d at 652.

Section 63-7-20(4)(a) of the
South Carolina Code (2010) defines child abuse as occurring  

when
the parent, guardian, or other person responsible for the child's welfare . . .
inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical or mental injury or
engages in acts or omissions which present a substantial risk of physical or
mental injury to the child, including injuries sustained as a result of
excessive corporal punishment . . . . 

In the instant case, Child stated Stepfather hit him in the chest, slapped
him in the face and head, and verbally abused him.  Child claimed
Stepfather hit him hard enough in the chest for him "to feel it for a few
minutes" and that Stepfather hit him hard enough to leave bruises.  In
addition, Child claimed Stepfather challenged him to a fight on numerous
occasions.  Further, although he disputed the severity of Child's
injuries, Stepfather admitted hitting Child in the chest and head, and Mother
also testified that Stepfather had hit Child.  Finally, the DSS caseworker and Child's
biological father testified Child had told them Stepfather was abusive.  Based
on the foregoing evidence, the family court did not err in determining
Stepfather's actions constituted abuse.  Accordingly, we affirm the family
court's finding that Stepfather abused Child. 

2. As to whether the
family court erred in ordering that Stepfather's name be placed on the Central
Registry for Child Abuse and Neglect, we affirm.

Section 63-7-1940 of the
South Carolina Code (2010) details the means by which a person is entered in
the Central Registry and provides as follows:

At a
hearing pursuant to Section 63-7-1650 or 63-7-1660, at which the court orders
that a child be taken or retained in custody or finds that the child was abused
or neglected, the court:

(1)
must order that a person's name be entered in the Central Registry of Child
Abuse and Neglect if the court finds that there is a preponderance of evidence
that the person physically or sexually abused or willfully or recklessly
neglected the child.  Placement on the Central Registry cannot be waived by any
party or by the court. 

Because we find the family
court did not err in finding Stepfather physically abused Child, we also find
the family court did not err pursuant to section 63-7-1940 in ordering that
Stepfather's name be placed on the Central Registry for Child Abuse and
Neglect. 

3. As to
whether the family court erred in ordering Stepfather to pay child support for
Child, we reverse.  Stepfather is not
Child's adoptive or biological father.  No South Carolina statutes or cases
impose the obligation on third parties to pay child support.  Accordingly, we reverse
the family court's order to the extent it imposes an obligation on Stepfather
to pay child support and remand for a recalculation of child support based
solely on Mother's obligation. 

4. As to whether the
family court erred in relying on the GAL's report when the GAL did not sign the
report or appear at the hearing, we affirm.  Stepfather's arguments are not
preserved for appeal.  Stepfather did not object to the introduction of the
GAL's report during the hearing.  See Spreeuw v. Barker, 385 S.C.
45, 70-71, 682 S.E.2d 843, 856 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding a father's challenges
to the GAL's report unpreserved when the father failed to object to the report
and noting that a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve issues for
appellate review).       

5. As to
whether the family court's order violated Rule 26(a), SCRFC, we affirm.  Rule
26(a), SCRFC, states that "[a]n order or judgment pursuant to an
adjudication in a domestic relations case shall set forth the specific findings
of fact and conclusions of law to support the court's decision."  Because
the family court's order in the instant case made specific findings of fact
regarding the pertinent issues involved, we find the family court's order in
the instant case sufficiently complied with the requirements of Rule 26(a).  

AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

FEW, C.J., and
THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.