State v. McFadden

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Darnell D. McFadden, Appellant.

Appeal From Florence County

Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-028

Heard November 16, 2011 – Filed January
25, 2012   

AFFIRMED

Tricia A. Blanchette, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Harold Coombs, all of Columbia; Solicitor
E.L. Clements, III, of Florence, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this criminal case, Darnell D. McFadden
argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to relieve counsel and not
granting him a continuance in order to obtain a private attorney.  He further
contends the trial court erred in admitting drug evidence because the chain of
custody was insufficient.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the
following authorities:

1. As to
whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to relieve counsel and not
granting him a continuance in order to obtain a private attorney: State v.
Gregory, 364 S.C. 150, 152, 612 S.E.2d 449, 450 (2005) (holding a motion to
relieve counsel is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and will not
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion); State v. Graddick, 345 S.C.
383, 386, 548 S.E.2d 210, 211 (2001) (noting the defendant bears the burden of
showing satisfactory cause for removal); id. (finding the trial court
did not err in denying the defendant's motion to relieve counsel when defendant
alleged counsel was not representing his interests, counsel was not fully
prepared for the case, and defendant did not feel comfortable going to court
with counsel as his lawyer); State v. Hyman, 276 S.C. 559, 562, 281
S.E.2d 209, 211 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) (finding the trial court did
not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's motion to relieve counsel
based on the defendant's allegation that counsel was "not up to date on
the law"); State v. Yarborough, 363 S.C. 260, 266, 609 S.E.2d 592,
595 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The granting of a motion for a continuance is within
the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a
clear showing of an abuse of discretion."); State v. McMillian, 349
S.C. 17, 21, 561 S.E.2d 602, 604 (2002) (providing a trial court's denial of a
motion for continuance will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion); id. ("Reversals of refusal of a continuance are about as rare as
the proverbial hens' teeth."). 

2. As to
whether the trial court erred in admitting drug evidence because the chain of
custody was allegedly insufficient: State
v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may
not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal."); State
v. Haselden, 353 S.C. 190, 196, 577 S.E.2d 445, 448 (2003) (finding unpreserved
appellant's argument testimony was improper character evidence when appellant
objected to the testimony only on basis of relevancy); State v. Benton,
338 S.C. 151, 157, 526 S.E.2d 228, 231 (2000) (finding an argument in support
of a jury charge on one ground was not preserved because appellant had argued
for the charge based on a different ground at trial); State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262,
265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of
the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the
trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of
law."); State v.
Hatcher, 392 S.C.
86, 91, 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("'[A] party offering into evidence
fungible items such as drugs . . . must establish a complete chain of custody
as far as practicable.'" (quoting State v. Sweet, 374 S.C. 1, 6,
647 S.E.2d 202, 205 (2007))); id. (finding that when
the substance analyzed has passed through several hands, the State must not
leave it to conjecture as to who had it and what was done with it between the
taking and the analysis); id. ("'Testimony from each custodian of
fungible evidence, however, is not a prerequisite to establishing a chain of
custody sufficient for admissibility.'" (quoting Sweet, 374 S.C. at
7, 647 S.E.2d at 206)); id. (holding that when other evidence
establishes the identity of those who have handled the evidence and reasonably
demonstrates the manner of handling of the evidence, courts will fill gaps in
the chain of custody due to an absent witness.); id. at 92, 708 S.E.2d
at 753 ("'Proof of chain of custody need not negate all possibility of
tampering so long as the chain of possession is complete.'" (quoting State
v. Carter, 344 S.C. 419, 424, 544 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2001))); Carter,
344 S.C. at 424, 544 S.E.2d at 837 (stating evidence is inadmissible only when
the chain of possession is missing a link because the identity of those who
handled the evidence was not established at least as far as practicable); id. (finding that when the identity of persons handling the specimen is
established, evidence regarding its care goes only to the weight of the
specimen as credible evidence); id. (providing that when the chain of
custody has a weak link, as opposed to a missing link, the question is only one
of credibility and not admissibility).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and
THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.