Reaves v. Ivey

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Reverend
Franklin C. Reaves, Appellant,

v.

Brenda Ivey,
City Treasurer of Mullins, J.C. Richardson, Tax Collector of the City of
Mullins, Robert H. Corley, City Attorney of Mullins, J. Wayne George, Mayor
of City of Mullins, George H. Hardwick, Director of Finance of City of
Mullins, Joyce W. Lett, Marion County Treasurer, John A. Padgett, Marion
County Auditor, Respondents.

Appeal From Marion County

Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-527

Submitted November 1, 2011 – Filed
December 2, 2011   

APPEAL DISMISSED

Rev. Franklin C. Reaves, pro se, of
Chadbourn, North Carolina.

Douglas C. Baxter and Mason A. Summers, both
of Myrtle Beach; and Robert T. King, of Florence, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Franklin C. Reaves appeals the denial of
his motion to reconsider the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Respondents.  Reaves argues the circuit court erred
in granting summary judgment based on a violation of the statute of limitations
applicable to the recovery of land sold at tax sales when he did not receive
the statutory notice of delinquent taxes and, in the alternative, paid the
taxes for the period during which the property was sold.[1]  We dismiss the appeal as
moot. [2]

Reaves's issues
on appeal stem from his claim that Respondents failed to give him notice of the
delinquent property taxes as required in section 12-51-40 of the South Carolina
Code (Supp. 1997).  Assuming without deciding that Reaves's claim of lack of
notice is supported by evidence and would entitle him to relief, the remedy
would consist of setting aside the tax sale of the property at issue.  See Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht
Sales, Inc., 342 S.C. 352, 364-65,
536 S.E.2d 698, 704 (Ct. App. 2000) ("[A]ll
conditions governing tax sales are mandatory and strictly enforced. . . . [and
an appellate court] will set aside tax sales where the requisite statutory
conditions of [section] 12-51-40 have not been complied with by public
officials.").  However, subsequent to the tax deed being issued, the
purchaser at the tax sale reconveyed the property to Reaves.  Therefore, setting aside the tax sale and consequently cancelling
the deed from the property record would have no practical legal effect, and
this appeal is moot.  See Sloan v.
Greenville Cnty., 380 S.C. 528, 535, 670
S.E.2d 663, 667 (Ct. App. 2009) ("An
appellate court will not pass judgment on moot and academic questions; it will
not adjudicate a matter when no actual controversy capable of specific relief
exists.  A case becomes moot when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical
legal effect upon the existing controversy."). 

APPEAL
DISMISSED.

SHORT,
WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1]The
circuit court's order separately granted Respondents' motion for summary
judgment as to Reaves's claim for damages resulting from Respondents' failure
to give him notice on the basis of the statute of limitations from the South
Carolina Tort Claims Act.  Reaves did not appeal that portion of the circuit
court's order. 

[2] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.