Mason v. Mason

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Fannie Mason, Respondent,

v.

Jerry Mason, Appellant.

Appeal From Marion County

Timothy H. Pogue, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-548

Submitted December 1, 2011 – Filed
December 6, 2011

AFFIRMED

Thurmond  Brooker, of Florence, for Appellant.

Nancy H. Bailey, of Florence, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jerry Mason (Husband) appeals the family court's order awarding Fannie
Mason (Wife) seventy-five percent of her
state retirement account and $1,319.27 in attorney's fees.  On appeal, Husband
argues the family court abused its
discretion in: (1) awarding him only twenty-five percent of Wife's state
retirement account; (2) declining to award him alimony; (3) awarding Wife $1,319.27
in attorney's fees; and (4) finding the 2005 Cadillac and the 2000 Denali were
not marital property.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and
the following authorities: 

1.  As to whether the
family court abused its discretion in
awarding Husband only twenty-five percent of Wife's monthly retirement pension: Doe v. Doe, 370 S.C. 206, 213, 634 S.E.2d 51, 55 (Ct. App. 2006) ("The division of marital property is in the family court's
discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion."); Deidun v. Deidun,  362 S.C. 47, 58, 606 S.E.2d 489,
495 (Ct. App. 2004) ("On appeal, this court looks to the overall
fairness of the apportionment."); Morris v.
Morris,  335 S.C. 525, 531, 517
S.E.2d 720, 723 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The
doctrine of equitable distribution is based on a recognition that marriage is,
among other things, an economic partnership . . . Upon dissolution of the
marriage, marital property should be divided and distributed in a manner which
fairly reflects each spouse's contribution to its acquisition, regardless of
who holds legal title." (citation
and quotation marks omitted)); Marsh
v. Marsh,  313 S.C. 42, 45, 437 S.E.2d 34, 36 (1993) (finding the
family court "is not required to divide all marital property between the
spouses based on the same percentage of division"); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-620
(Supp. 2010) (identifying fifteen factors for the court to consider in
equitably apportioning a marital estate).  

2.  As to whether the family
court abused its discretion in not awarding Husband alimony: Browder v. Browder, 382 S.C. 512, 518-19, 675 S.E.2d 820, 823 (Ct. App.
2009) ("An award of alimony rests within
the sound discretion of the family court and will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. . . . An abuse of discretion occurs if the court's ruling
is controlled by an error of law or if the ruling is based upon findings of
fact that are without evidentiary support."); id. at 519, 675 S.E.2d at 823 ("The objective of
alimony should be to insure that the parties separate on as equal a basis as
possible. . . . Thus, [i]t is the duty of the family court to make an alimony
award that is fit, equitable, and just if the claim is well founded." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(alteration by court)); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(C) (Supp. 2010) (providing
the thirteen factors for consideration in awarding alimony).

3.  As to whether the family court
abused its discretion in awarding Wife attorney's fees: Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 88, 641 S.E.2d 446, 458 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An
award of attorney's fees lies within the sound discretion of the family court
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."); E.D.M.
v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 476-77, 415 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992) ("In
determining whether an attorney's fee should be awarded, the following factors
should be considered: (1) the party's
ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by
the attorney; (3) the parties' respective
financial conditions; and (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each party's
standard of living."); Glasscock v. Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 161,
403 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1991) ("[T]he six factors . . . in determining a
reasonable attorney's fee:  (1) the
nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to
the case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of
compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained; [and] (6) customary legal
fees for similar services."). 

4.  As to whether the family court
abused its discretion in determining the Cadillac and Denali were not marital
property: S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A) (Supp. 2010) (defining marital property
as "all real and personal property which has been acquired by the parties
during the marriage and which is owned as of the date of filing or commencement
of marital litigation as provided in Section 20-3-620 regardless of how legal
title is held"); Pruitt v. Pruitt, 389 S.C. 250, 261, 697 S.E.2d
702, 708 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The spouse claiming an equitable interest
in property upon dissolution of the marriage has the burden of proving the
property is part of the marital estate."  (citation and quotation marks
omitted)); Brown v. Brown, 379 S.C. 271, 283-84, 665 S.E.2d 174,
181 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding the family court erred in finding Husband's
guns were marital property because Wife failed to present sufficient evidence
that they were marital property). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ. concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.