State v. Welch

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent

v.

Reico Lamar
Welch, Appellant.

Appeal From York County

 Larry B. Hyman, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-572

Heard December 6, 2011 – Filed December
20, 2011 

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Elizabeth Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John
W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant
Attorney General David Spencer, all of Columbia; Solicitor Kevin Brackett, of
York, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Reico
Welch appeals his conviction for first-degree burglary, arguing the circuit
court improperly considered three prior out-of-state offenses for breaking and
entering that were consolidated into a single judgment against him.  Welch
claims the circuit court impermissibly considered this single judgment as three
convictions, which resulted in an improperly enhanced charge of first-degree
burglary. 

We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:  S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-11-311 (2003) (stating a person is guilty of first-degree burglary "if
the person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime
in the dwelling, and . . . the burglary is committed by a person with a prior
record of two or more convictions for burglary or housebreaking or a
combination of both . . . .") (emphasis added); N.C. Gen.Stat. §
15A-1340.15(b) (2009) ("If an offender is convicted of more than
one offense at the same time, the court may consolidate the offenses for
judgment and impose a single judgment for the consolidated offenses.")
(emphasis added); State v. Miller, 341 S.E.2d 531, 538 (N.C. 1986)
(discussing the benefits of consolidating plea bargains for judgment and
stating "the very purpose of consolidation for sentencing purposes is to .
. . benefit [] the defendant by limiting the maximum sentence that he can receive
for all of the convictions so consolidated");  see also Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc.
v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65,
69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996) ("Unless there is something in the statute
requiring a different interpretation, the words used in a statute must be given
their ordinary meaning."); State v. Landis, 362 S.C. 97, 102, 606
S.E.2d 503, 505 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding the legislature's intent should be
ascertained primarily from the plain language of the statute).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.