State v. Grant

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Derrick Grant, Appellant.

Appeal From Berkeley County

 R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-499

Submitted November 1, 2011 – Filed
November 9, 2011

AFFIRMED

Senior Appellate Defender Joseph L. Savitz, III, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General
John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant
Attorney General Melody J. Brown, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett A.
Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Derrick Grant appeals his conviction for
murder, arguing the circuit court erred in allowing him to proceed with his
trial pro se because his waiver of his right to counsel was not knowingly and
intelligently made.[1] 
We affirm.[2]

A
defendant may waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se.  State v.
McLauren, 349 S.C. 488, 493, 563 S.E.2d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 2002); see
also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1975)
("[F]orcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic
right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so.").  The waiver,
however, must be made knowingly and intelligently.  McLauren, 349 S.C. at
493, 563 S.E.2d at 348.  The defendant must be (1) advised of his right to
counsel and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation.  Id. at 493, 563 S.E.2d at 348-49.  "[T]he record [must] establish [the
defendant] knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus,
"[t]he ultimate test of whether a defendant has made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is not the [circuit court's] advice,
but the defendant's understanding."  McLauren, 349 S.C. at 493, 563
S.E.2d at 348 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  "In the
absence of a specific inquiry by the [circuit court] addressing the
disadvantages of a pro se defense as required by the second Faretta prong, the appellate court will look to the record to determine whether [a
defendant] had sufficient background or was apprised of his rights by some
other source."  Id. at 494, 563 S.E.2d at 349; cf. Faretta,
422 U.S. at 835 ("The record affirmatively shows that Faretta was
literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising
his informed free will.").

South
Carolina courts consider the following series of factors "in determining
if [a defendant] had sufficient background to understand the disadvantages of
self-representation":

(1)
the [defendant's] age, educational background, and physical and mental health;
(2) whether the [defendant] was previously involved in criminal trials; (3)
whether he knew of the nature of the charge and of the possible penalties; (4)
whether he was represented by counsel before trial or whether an attorney
indicated to him the difficulty of self-representation in his particular case;
(5) whether he was attempting to delay or manipulate the proceedings; (6)
whether the court appointed stand-by counsel; (7) whether the accused knew he
would be required to comply with the rules of procedure at trial; (8) whether
he knew of legal challenges he could raise in defense to the charges against
him; (9) whether the exchange between the [defendant] and the court consisted
merely of pro forma answers to pro forma questions;
and (10) whether the [defendant's] waiver resulted from either coercion or
mistreatment.

State v. Cash, 309 S.C. 40, 42-43, 419 S.E.2d 811, 813 (Ct. App.
1992).

Here,
we find the record shows Grant was knowingly and voluntarily exercising his
informed free will.  In addition to the circuit court's repeated warnings of
the dangers of self-representation throughout the pretrial phase and at the
beginning of the trial, the record, in light of the Cash factors,
supports the finding Grant understood his right to counsel and the consequences
of self-representation.  Grant was a literate adult with a criminal history,
but no evidence suggests any physical or mental impairment.  He was represented
by counsel until he requested the circuit court, approximately four months
after his arrest, to relieve him of his representation for irreconcilable
differences over how his defense should be conducted.  Grant never attempted to
delay proceedings, voluntarily withdrawing his only motion for a continuance of
the trial.  Up until he was assisted by standby counsel, he made several
motions to suppress evidence and requests for discovery materials under Rule 5,
SCRCrimP.  Moreover, the circuit court, on multiple occasions, suggested he
retain a public defender to represent him.  However, Grant made his mistrust of
public defenders clear, noting he was comfortable with his self-representation
while also declaring he was "scared out of [his] mind, not knowing nothing
about nothing."  Cf. Faratta, 422 U.S. at 807-08 (involving
a defendant who opted to represent himself because of what he perceived as an
overwhelming caseload of the public defender).

At
trial, Grant displayed a competent understanding of the process.  He made
several objections and successfully suppressed a photograph for its prejudicial
effect.  He cross-examined many of the State's witnesses, engaging the State's
investigators in particularly lengthy examinations.  Thus, the record shows
Grant knew what he was doing and that he made his choice with eyes open. 
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] Because we find the waiver was valid, we decline to
address any remaining issues.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an
appellate court need not review remaining issues when its determination of a
prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

[2] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.