SCDSS v. Jacqueline C.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Social Services, Respondent,

v.

Jacqueline C.,
James H., Martin C., Defendants,

Of whom James
H. is the Appellant.

In the interest of a minor child under the age of 18 years.

Appeal From York County

Henry T. Woods, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-429 

Submitted September 1, 2011 – Filed
October 3, 2011

#2010174646

AFFIRMED

Elizabeth Hope Rainey, of Rock Hill, for
Appellant.

David E. Simpson, of Rock Hill, for
Respondent.

Rosalee Hix Davis, of Rock Hill, for
Guardian Ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: James
H. (Father) appeals the family court's order terminating parental rights (TPR)
to his minor child (Child).  On appeal, Father argues the family court erred
in: (1) granting TPR on the unpled statutory ground that Child has resided in
foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months; (2) considering
the testimony of the foster parent and potential adoptive parent for the best
interest of the child analysis; (3) allowing the Department of Social Services
(DSS) to argue that TPR was the only placement option for Child because section
63-7-1700(F) of the South Carolina Code (2010) does not permit an extension of
the permanency placement plan beyond eighteen months after Child was placed in
foster care; (4) terminating Father's parental rights when DSS's complaint
failed to set forth the underlying factual circumstances as required by section
63-7-2540(6); and (5) granting TPR when the family court's prior orders
concerning Child's protection and permanency failed to provide Father notice as
required under section 63-7-1680 that if he did not comply with his treatment
plan, his parental rights could be terminated in six months.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:      

1.  As to whether the family court erred
in allowing DSS to argue that TPR was the only placement option for Child
because section 63-7-1700(F) does not permit an extension of the permanency
placement plan beyond eighteen months after Child was placed in foster care: Hooper
v. Rockwell,  334 S.C. 281, 291, 513 S.E.2d 358, 364 (1999) ("[A]ny
order issued as a result of a merit hearing, as well as any later order issued
with regard to a treatment, placement, or permanent plan, is a final order that
a party must timely appeal."); Reiss v. Reiss, 392 S.C. 198,
206-07, 708 S.E.2d 799, 803 (Ct. App. 2011) (finding an unappealed ruling
becomes the law of the case and cannot be considered on appeal). 

2.   As to whether the family court erred
in giving too much weight to the testimony of the foster parent and potential
adoptive parent for the best interest of the child analysis: Lewis v. Lewis,
392 S.C. 381, 388-89, 709 S.E.2d 650, 653-54 (2011) (noting although this court
reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not required to ignore the
fact that the family court, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better
position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their
testimony); Ex parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56, 61-62, 624 S.E.2d 649, 652
(2006) ("This broad scope of review does not, however, require the
appellate court to disregard the findings of the family court. This degree of
deference is especially true in cases involving the welfare and best interests
of a minor child.") (internal citation omitted). 

3.  As to Father's remaining issues: Biggins v. Burdette, 392 S.C. 241, 246, 708 S.E.2d 237, 240 (Ct. App. 2011) (finding
an issue is not preserved for our review when it is not raised to and ruled on
by the family court). 

AFFIRMED.

SHORT,
WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.