State v. Robinson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR
RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2),
SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jermel Anthony
Robinson, Appellant.

Appeal From Sumter County

 R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-435

Submitted October 1, 2011 – Filed October
11, 2011

AFFIRMED

Senior Appellate Defender Joseph L.
Savitz, III, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Christina Catoe, all of Columbia; and
Solicitor Ernest A. Finney, III, of Sumter, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Jermel
Anthony Robinson appeals his conviction for first-degree lynching.  On appeal,
he argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. 
We affirm.[1] 

"Any act of violence inflicted by a mob upon the
body of another person which results in the death of the person shall
constitute the crime of lynching in the first degree."  S.C. Code Ann. §
16-3-210 (2003).  A "mob" is "the assemblage of two or more
persons . . . for the premeditated purpose and with the premeditated intent of
committing an act of violence upon the person of another."  S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-3-230 (2003). 

In the instant case, the State proffered evidence Robinson and Teron Hakeen Jackson, in an attempt to
rob the victim, surreptitiously observed the victim sitting in his parked car for
more than an hour in order to conduct surveillance and plan the robbery, donned
dark clothes and masks, armed themselves, and charged the victim from either
side with their guns drawn.  Jackson confessed to shooting the victim multiple
times, resulting in his death.  In light of this evidence, it was reasonable
for the jury to infer Robinson's premeditated intent to commit an act of
violence upon the victim and to disbelieve Robinson's assertion he did not
intend to harm the victim.  See State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295,
299, 185 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971) ("Intent is seldom susceptible to proof by
direct evidence and must ordinarily be proven by circumstantial evidence, that
is, by facts and circumstances from which intent may be inferred.").  Accordingly, the State proffered sufficient evidence
to overcome Robinson's motion for a directed verdict on his first-degree lynching
charge.  See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641,
648 (2006) (holding "[w]hen ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the
trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not
its weight").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ.,
concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.