State v. Smith

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Travis Smith, Appellant.

Appeal From Spartanburg County

J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-201   

Submitted May 1, 2011 – Filed May 3, 2011

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Barnette, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Travis
Smith appeals his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, arguing the circuit
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence of cocaine as fruit
of an illegal search.  He contends the deputy lacked a reasonable suspicion he
was armed when the deputy asked him to step out of a vehicle for a pat-down
search.  We affirm.[1]

"On appeals from a motion to suppress based on Fourth Amendment grounds,
[an appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse
if there is clear error."  State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518,
521, 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010).  An appellate court, however, may review the
record to "determine whether the [circuit
court's] decision is supported by the evidence."  Id.  Once
a vehicle is lawfully stopped, officers "may order passengers to get out
of the car pending completion of the stop."  Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997) (reasoning that "danger to an officer from a
traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to
the driver of a stopped car").  Moreover, the Fourth Amendment
"permit[s] a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the
police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest
the individual for a crime."  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968).  The circuit court must decide "whether a reasonably prudent man
in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that
others was in danger."  Id.

In affirming the
circuit court, we rely on State v.
Smith, 329 S.C. 550, 553-54, 495
S.E.2d 798, 800 (Ct. App. 1998), in which this court upheld the circuit court's
denial of a motion to suppress evidence when an officer ordered a driver out of
the car and frisked him because he "was fidgeting and looking around on
the inside like looking for a weapon."  The officer in Smith testified he "thought for officer safety, better to bring him out of the
vehicle to keep him away from any weapons opportunity." Id. at 554,
495 S.E.2d at 800.  Here, given the circumstances, the deputy's concern for his
safety was reasonable.  Smith presented the deputy with a hotel key card instead
of his identification.  Moreover, Smith appeared to the deputy as if he was
trying to conceal something in his baggy clothing while he searched for his
identification.  The deputy testified he was concerned Smith had a gun.  We
find no clear error in the circuit court's ruling that the pat-down search was
reasonable and refusal to suppress the cocaine evidence that was subsequently
abandoned by Smith.  Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and
THOMAS, JJ., concur. 

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.