SAFE Federal Credit Union v. Henry

CourtListener 10154008ScctappMay 18, 2011

Full text

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

SAFE Federal
Credit Union, Respondent,

v.

Jefford Henry,
Jr., Appellant.

Appeal From Lee County

R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-230

Submitted May 1, 2011 – Filed May 18, 2011   

AFFIRMED

Jefford Henry, Jr., pro se, of
Bishopville, for Appellant.

Christy C. Jones, of Lexington, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jefford
Henry, Jr. appeals a trial court's grant of summary judgment to SAFE Federal
Credit Union (SAFE) in two causes of action for recovery of an automobile and
collection of an $8,371.20 balance on the related purchase-money loan.  Henry
argues the trial court erred because (1) the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction; (2) the summary judgment affidavits offered by SAFE were
inadmissible; and (3) he presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether he satisfied the loan and SAFE retained
an interest in the automobile.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction: S.C. Const. art. V, § 11 (providing the circuit courts
have "original jurisdiction" in civil cases where the legislature has not
granted "exclusive jurisdiction" to "inferior
courts").

2. As to
whether the summary judgment affidavits
offered by SAFE were inadmissible: Holroyd v.
Requa, 361 S.C. 43, 60, 603 S.E.2d 417, 426 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Failure to object to the introduction of evidence at the
time the evidence is offered constitutes a waiver of the right to have the
issue considered on appeal.") (citations
omitted).

3. As to
whether Henry presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of material
fact: Bovain v. Canal Ins., 383 S.C. 100, 105, 678 S.E.2d 422, 424 (2009) ("[A]
trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment if . . . there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Klippel
v. Mid-Carolina Oil, Inc., 303 S.C. 127, 129, 399 S.E.2d 163, 164 (Ct. App.
1990) ("Under Rule 56, SCRCP, when a party makes a motion for summary
judgment and supports it by affidavits the adverse party may not rest on the
allegations of his pleadings but must respond by affidavits or other evidence
demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact."); see also Higgins
v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 326 S.C. 592, 599, 486 S.E.2d 269, 272 (Ct. App.
1997) (holding the trial court ordinarily may not consider factual statements
made during argument on the summary judgment issue) (citation omitted). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW,
C.J., PIEPER and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

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