SunTrust Mortgage v. Smith

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

SunTrust
Mortgage, Inc., Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely
as a nominee for SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., and SunTrust Bank, Respondents,

v.

Jonathan H.
Smith and Nicole M. Smith, aka Nicole Smith, Appellants.

Appeal From Charleston County

Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-225

Submitted May 1, 2011 – Filed May 18, 2011   

AFFIRMED

Christopher Michael Ramsey, of Charleston,
for Appellants.

Kirsten E. Small and Suzanne Taylor Graham
Grigg, both of Greenville, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  Jonathan H. Smith and Nicole M. Smith
appeal the master-in-equity's grant of a foreclosure in favor of SunTrust
Mortgage, Inc.; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely
as a nominee for SunTrust Mortgage; and SunTrust Bank.  On appeal, the Smiths
argue the master erred in denying a motion for leave to amend an answer and a motion
for a continuance.  Additionally, they contend the master erred in entering a
foreclosure judgment against the Smiths based solely on the testimony of a
SunTrust Bank employee who had no personal knowledge of Smith's account.  We
affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying the motion
for leave to amend and the motion for a continuance:  Berry v. McLeod,
328 S.C. 435, 450, 492 S.E.2d 794, 802 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Courts have wide latitude in amending pleadings.
. . . [T]he decision to allow an amendment is within the sound discretion of
the trial court and will rarely be disturbed on appeal.  The trial [court's]
finding will not be overturned without an abuse of discretion or unless
manifest injustice has occurred."); State v. Brown, 389 S.C. 84,
94, 697 S.E.2d 622, 628 (Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]he trial court's decision to
deny a motion for continuance is a matter within the trial court's discretion.
As such, [an appellate] court will not reverse the trial court unless there was
an abuse of discretion that resulted in prejudice."). 

2. As to whether the
trial court erred in entering a foreclosure judgment against the Smiths based
solely on the testimony of a SunTrust Bank employee who had no personal knowledge
of Smith's account:  Calcutt v. Calcutt, 282 S.C. 565, 569, 320 S.E.2d
55, 57 (Ct. App. 1984) ("The failure to make a timely and proper objection
to the introduction of testimony waives the right to object to such testimony
on appeal.") (citation omitted).    

AFFIRMED.

SHORT,
KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.