State v. Hatchell

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Middleton L. Hatchell, Appellant.

Appeal From Lexington County

R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-239

Submitted May 1, 2011 – Filed May 24, 2011   

AFFIRMED

Benjamin A. Stitely and Robert T.
Williams, Sr., both of Lexington, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, all of
Columbia; and Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Middleton
L. Hatchell appeals his convictions for two counts of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor, one count of lewd act upon a child, and one
count of disseminating harmful material to a minor.  He argues the trial court
erred in denying his motions to quash the indictments and motions for a
directed verdict.  We affirm.[1]

I. INDICTMENTS

Hatchell argues the trial
court erred in denying his motions to quash the indictments because the periods
stated on the indictments were too long to provide notice of the charges
against him.  We disagree.

To
determine whether the period alleged in the indictment provides sufficient
notice to a defendant, this court uses a two-prong test: "(1) whether time
is a material element of the offense; and (2) whether the time period covered
by the indictment occurred prior to the return of the indictment by the grand
jury."  State v. Tumbleston, 376 S.C. 90, 98-99, 654 S.E.2d 849,
853-54 (Ct. App. 2007). 

Here, the periods alleged in
Hatchell's indictments provided him sufficient notice to prepare an adequate
defense.  First, time is not a material element of the CSC, lewd act, or
dissemination offenses.  State v. Baker, 390 S.C. 56, 62-63, 700 S.E.2d 440,
442 (Ct. App. 2010); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-385(A)-(B) (2003) (providing
a person is guilty of disseminating harmful material to minors "if,
knowing the character or content of the material, he . . . allows a
minor to review or peruse material that is harmful to minors" or 
"allows a minor to view a live performance which is harmful to
minors").  Second, the periods alleged in the indictments occurred before
Hatchell was indicted.  Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the
motions to quash the indictments.

II. MOTIONS
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT

Hatchell
maintains the trial court erred in denying his motions for a directed verdict
because the State's evidence amounted only to a suspicion of guilt.  We
disagree.

"When
reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party."  State v. Brannon, 388 S.C. 498, 501, 697 S.E.2d 593, 595
(2010) (internal citations omitted).  "[T]he [S]tate must present any
direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence . . . from
which the defendant's guilt can be fairly and logically deduced."  State
v. Muhammed, 338 S.C. 22, 26, 524 S.E.2d 637, 639 (Ct. App. 1999)
(citations omitted).

"A
person is guilty of [CSC] with a minor in the second degree if: (1) the actor
engages in sexual battery with a victim who is fourteen years of age or less
but who is at least eleven years of age . . . ."  S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-3-655(B) (Supp. 2010).  A person is guilty of committing a lewd act
upon a child if the person is "over the age of fourteen years [and]
. . . willfully and lewdly commit[s] . . . a lewd or
lascivious act upon or with the body, or its parts, of a child under the age of
sixteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the
lust or passions or sexual desires of the person or of the child."  S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-15-140 (2003).  A person is guilty of disseminating harmful
material to minors "if, knowing the character or content of the material,
he . . . allows a minor to review or peruse material that is harmful
to minors" or  "allows a minor to view a live performance which is
harmful to minors."  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-385(A)-(B) (2003). 

As to the CSC charges, the
State presented testimony Hatchell had sex with the victim multiple times while
she was between the ages of eleven and twelve.  Regarding the lewd act charge,
the State presented testimony Hatchell repeatedly had sex with the victim and
touched her breasts and vagina while she was between the ages of nine and
twelve.  For the dissemination charge, the State presented testimony Hatchell
showed a pornographic video to the victim and did not attempt to turn it off
after it began playing.  Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the
motions for a directed verdict.

AFFIRMED.

FEW,
C.J., PIEPER and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.