State v. Brown

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

David Lee Brown, Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County

  Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.   2011-UP-185

Heard April 7, 2011 – Filed April 25, 2011

AFFIRMED

 

Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John
W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley Elliott, Senior Assistant
Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett
Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Appellant David Lee Brown appeals his
convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a violent crime.  On appeal, Brown argues the trial court erred in failing
to exclude evidence seized after the detention of a vehicle without reasonable
suspicion.[1] 
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:  Hiibel
v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004)
("In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for
identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment."); id. ("[A] law enforcement officer's reasonable suspicion that a person may be
involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a
brief time and take additional steps to investigate further."); Illinois
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 129 n.3 (2000) ("A shrewd man sees trouble
coming and lies low. . . ."); U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229
(1985) (noting the ability of the police to briefly stop a person suspected of
involvement in a past crime, ask questions, or check identification in the
absence of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving
crimes and bringing offenders to justice); U.S. v. Quarles, 330 F.3d
650, 653 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding law enforcement officials may detain a
defendant upon reasonable suspicion that the person they encountered was
involved in or wanted in connection with a completed felony); State v.
Blassingame, 338 S.C. 240, 248, 525 S.E.2d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 1999)
("The term 'reasonable suspicion' requires a particularized and objective
basis that would lead one to suspect another of criminal activity."); id. ("In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the whole picture
must be considered."). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and
HUFF and PIEPER, JJ., concur.

[1] At oral arguments, counsel confirmed our reading of
the appellant’s brief that Brown only challenges the initial acts of Officer
Bonanni in
requesting the driver’s license and parking behind the driver’s vehicle.  Brown
does not challenge the actions of any of the other officers.