State v. Watkins

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Robert Watkins, Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County

Larry R. Patterson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-091

Submitted February 1, 2011 – Filed March 8,
2011   

REVERSED

Appellate Defender Elizabeth
Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Robert M. Arial, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Robert
Watkins appeals his convictions for armed robbery and possession of a weapon
during the commission of a violent crime.  His trial resulted from a grant of
post-conviction relief (PCR) by the South Carolina Supreme Court.  The judge of
that new trial was the same judge who presided over Watkins's PCR hearing.  On
appeal from the new trial, Watkins argues the trial judge erred in (1) denying
Watkins's recusal motion and (2) granting Watkins's motion to proceed pro se. 
We reverse.[1]

Generally, "[a]
judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . ."  Canon 3(E)(1), CJC, Rule
501, SCACR.  In Floyd v. State, 303 S.C. 298, 400 S.E.2d 145 (1991), the South Carolina Supreme Court granted a defendant a
new PCR hearing because the judge who presided over his PCR hearing also
presided over the trial from which PCR was sought.  Id. at 299, 400
S.E.2d at 146.  The court held that "in all [PCR] hearings . . . , a judge shall, upon
motion, recuse himself if he was the judge who presided at the guilty plea,
criminal trial, or probation revocation proceeding for which relief is being
sought."  Id.  The Floyd court emphasized that "a per se rule of
recusal . . . will eliminate even the suggestion of partiality."  Id.

Here, we find Floyd's
reasoning is equally applicable to the situation presented by Watkins's new
trial.  As held in Floyd, a judge must grant a recusal motion made
during a new trial arising from a PCR hearing in which the judge also
sat.  Accordingly, the trial judge erred in denying Watkins's motion for recusal.

Because we reverse the trial
court on the above issue, we do not address Watkins's remaining argument.  See State v. Taylor,
388 S.C. 101, 124 n.23, 694 S.E.2d 60, 72 n.23 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that an
appellate court need not address remaining issues when a decision on a prior
issue is dispositive). 

REVERSED.

WILLIAMS,
GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.