SCDMV v. Gibbs

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Motor Vehicles, Appellant,

v.

Dominic
Vladimir Gibbs, Respondent.

Appeal from the Administrative Law Court

Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-107

Submitted March 1, 2011 – March  16,
2011

REVERSED AND REMANDED

General Counsel Frank L. Valenta, Jr.,
Deputy General Counsel Philip S. Porter, and Assistant General Counsel Linda A.
Grice, all of Blythewood, for Appellant.

Dominic V. Gibbs, pro se, of Anderson, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  The
Department of Motor Vehicles (the DMV) appeals the reinstatement of Dominic
Gibbs's driver's license by the Administrative Law Court (the ALC).  Gibbs did
not file a respondent’s brief.  We reverse and remand.[1]

The ALC held the
DMV improperly declared Gibbs a habitual offender because one of Gibbs' three driving
under suspension convictions could not support habitual offender status.  The ALC
ruled the offense fell under a statutory exception that precluded basing habitual offender status upon convictions of driving
under suspension for the failure to file proof of financial responsibility.  The
DMV argues the relevant conviction of driving under suspension did not fall
within that exception because the suspension was based upon a different
offense: the failure to show proof of insurance when stopped by a police
officer.  We agree.

When this court reviews an
ALC's decision on appeal from the DMV, this court may
reverse or modify the decision if the decision is affected by an error of law.  S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Holtzclaw, 382 S.C. 344, 347, 675 S.E.2d
756, 758 (Ct. App. 2009).  The supreme court has focused on the plain language
of the habitual offender statute when construing its meaning.  S.C. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles v. Blackwell, 389 S.C. 293, 296, 698 S.E.2d 770, 772 (2010). 
Under that statute, the DMV may declare a person a habitual offender if the
person has been convicted of three or more qualifying offenses committed within
a three-year period.  S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020(a) (2006).  Those qualifying
offenses include driving under suspension, "except a conviction for
driving under suspension for failure to file proof of financial responsibility
. . . ."  § 56-1-1020(a)(4). 

Here, we hold the ALC erred
in treating Gibbs's conviction of driving under suspension for failure to show
proof of insurance to a police officer as the same offense as a conviction of
driving under suspension for failure to file proof of financial
responsibility.  The habitual offender statute's exception refers to various
sections of the Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Act requiring a person to file a certificate of insurance
or bond with the DMV.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-540 to -570 (2006) ("Proof of financial responsibility when required
. . . may be given by filing [with the DMV]: (1) [a] certificate of insurance . . . [or]
(2) [a] bond . . . ."); see also S.C. Code Ann. §
56-9-361, -460 (2006) (providing that the DMV may
allow a suspended driver to keep a license to operate a vehicle owned by an
employer if the employer "furnishe[s] proof of financial responsibility
. . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-440, -470 (2006)
(providing that if a judgment creditor of a motor vehicle accident consents,
the judgment debtor who was uninsured at the time of the accident may retain
driving privileges so long as the judgment debtor "furnishes proof of
financial responsibility," and if the judgment creditor does not so
consent, the judgment debtor's license will remain suspended until the debtor
fully satisfies every judgment and "gives proof of financial
responsibility . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-540 (2006) ("Whenever any proof of financial responsibility filed by any
person as required by [the Act] no longer fulfills the purpose for which
required, the director shall require other proof of financial responsibility
. . . .").  

Unlike those
sections, the statute for the failure to show a police officer proof of insurance
is a different offense from the failure to file proof of financial
responsibility with the DMV.  See S.C.
Code Ann. § 56-10-225(A)-(B) (2006) (providing "[a] person whose application for registration and licensing of a motor
vehicle has been approved by the [DMV] must maintain in the motor vehicle at
all times proof that the motor vehicle is an insured vehicle" and
"[t]he owner of a motor vehicle must maintain proof of financial
responsibility in the motor vehicle at all times, and it must be displayed upon
demand of a police officer . . .").  Therefore, the
habitual offender statute's exception does not apply to a conviction for
driving under suspension for failure to show proof of insurance to a police
officer.  The ALC erred in holding Gibbs's conviction could not support the
DMV's declaration that he was a habitual offender. 

Because we reverse the ALC on
the above issue, we do not address the DMV's remaining arguments.  See Bailey v. S.C.
Dep't of Health, 388 S.C. 1, 8, 693 S.E.2d 426, 430 (Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that an appellate court need not address remaining issues when a
decision on a prior issue is dispositive). 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

HUFF, SHORT, and PIEPER,
JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.