Haney v. Ray's Vacuum and Sewing Center of Spartanburg

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Walter P.
Haney, Jr., Claimant, Respondent,

v.

Ray's Vacuum
and Sewing Center of Spartanburg, Employer; South Carolina Uninsured
Employer's Fund; and CNA Insurance Company, Carrier, Defendants,

Of Whom Ray's
Vacuum and Sewing Center of Spartanburg and South Carolina Uninsured
Employer's Fund are the Appellants,

And CNA
Insurance Company is the Respondent.

Appeal From Spartanburg County

 J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.   2011-UP-128

Submitted March 1, 2011 – Filed March 28,
2011

AFFIRMED

C. Roland Jones, Jr., of Spartanburg, for Appellant South Carolina
Uninsured Employers' Fund.

Toney J. Lister, of Spartanburg, for Appellant Ray's Vacuum and
Sewing Center of Spartanburg.

Danny R. Smith and Max T. Hyde, Jr., both of Spartanburg, for
Respondent Walter P. Haney, Jr.

Weston Adams, III, Helen F. Hiser, C. Edward Rawl, Jr., and Scott
B. Garrett, all of Columbia, for Respondent CNA Insurance Company.

PER CURIAM:  Ray's Vacuum and Sewing Center of Spartanburg (Ray's)
and the South Carolina Uninsured Employers' Fund (the Fund) appeal the circuit
court's order affirming the decision of the Appellate Panel of the Workers'
Compensation Commission (the Appellate Panel).  They argue the circuit court
erred in holding (1) the "last injurious exposure" rule applied and
(2) substantial evidence supported the finding that Walter P. Haney, Jr., was
entitled to temporary total disability benefits.  We affirm.[1]

1. We hold the circuit
court correctly applied the "last injurious exposure" rule in
determining that Ray's and the Fund were liable for compensating Haney's
disability because substantial evidence supports the Appellate Panel's finding
Haney's final exposure to the cause of his carpel tunnel syndrome occurred on
August 31, 2004, when Ray's lacked workers' compensation insurance coverage.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2010) (limiting a
reviewing court to correcting errors of law or factual findings that are
"clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record").  Haney's August 31, 2004 injury was not a
recurrence of an earlier injury; instead, it was an independent traumatic event
that contributed to the causation of his disability.  See Geathers v.
3V, Inc., 371 S.C. 570, 577-79, 641 S.E.2d 29, 33-34 (2007) (citation
omitted) (adopting the "last injurious exposure" rule, which "'places full liability upon the carrier covering the
risk at the time of the most recent injury that bears a causal relation to the
disability'"); Bass
v. Isochem, 365 S.C. 454, 474-75, 617 S.E.2d 369, 380 (Ct. App. 2005)
(explaining carpel tunnel syndrome is a repetitive trauma injury, having
"a gradual onset caused by the cumulative effect of repetitive traumatic events
or 'mini accidents'").

2. We hold the circuit
court properly upheld the Appellate Panel's finding of temporary total
disability because substantial evidence indicates Haney was terminated and unable
to find subsequent work because of his carpel tunnel syndrome.  See S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2010).

AFFIRMED.

FEW,
C.J., THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.