State v. Butler

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Beulah R.
Butler, Appellant.

Appeal From Lexington County

 R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-127

Submitted March 1, 2011 – Filed March 28,
2011

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John
W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Beulah
R. Butler appeals her convictions of voluntary manslaughter and possession of a
firearm or a knife during the commission of a violent crime.  On appeal, Butler
contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict,
arguing the trial court erred in the following: (1) "[failing to] apply
the standard that the [S]tate had to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt at the directed verdict stage" and (2) "only [applying] the
traditional 'any evidence' standard of voluntary manslaughter without regard to
self-defense."  We disagree.

"There
are four elements required by law to establish self-defense."  State v.
Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 46, 317 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984).  The elements include:

First,
the defendant must be without fault in bringing on the difficulty. Second, the
defendant must have actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his
life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in such imminent
danger.  Third, if his defense is based upon his belief of imminent danger, a
reasonably prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained
the same belief. If the defendant actually was in imminent danger, the
circumstances were such as would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness
and courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself from serious
bodily harm or losing his own life. Fourth, the defendant had no other probable
means of avoiding the danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious
bodily injury than to act as he did in this particular instance. If, however,
the defendant was on his own premises he had no duty to retreat before acting
in self-defense.

Id.

The
State produced sufficient evidence showing Butler did not act in self-defense. 
Specifically, the State produced evidence negating the second element of
self-defense that "the defendant must have actually believed he was in
imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he
actually was in such imminent danger."  Id.  The evidence presented
included Butler's own statements that she was not acting to defend herself from
"imminent danger," but rather that the incident was merely an
accident.  Butler made statements that the Victim "rolled over on the
knife," "fell on the knife," and "jumped over the couch and
landed on the knife."  Additionally, Butler admitted on cross-examination
she did not act in self-defense, but rather the stabbing was an accident.  Thus,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence
supported submitting the case to the jury.

AFFIRMED.[1]

FEW, C.J., THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.