State v. Anderson

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Victor Harvey
Anderson, Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County

R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-015

Submitted November 1, 2010 – Filed January
25, 2011   

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of
Columbia; Solicitor Scarlett Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Victor
Harvey Anderson appeals his conviction for failure to register as a sex
offender, arguing the trial court erred in (1) declining to find the Sex
Offender Registry Law unconstitutional and in violation of the Due Process
Clause; (2) denying his motion for directed verdict; (3) admitting testimony
regarding a prior bad act; and (4) admitting testimony regarding a form signed
by Anderson.  We affirm.[1] 

1. As to whether the trial court
erred in declining to find the Sex Offender Registry Law unconstitutional, this
issue is not preserved for our review because Anderson did not raise this issue
to the trial court.  See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587
S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for
appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial
judge."). 

2. As to whether the trial court
erred in denying Anderson's motion for directed verdict because the State did
not provide evidence of notice, a review of the statutory language in section
23-3-460 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2009) indicates the South Carolina
Legislature did not include language requiring the State to notify sex
offenders regarding the change in registration requirements when it amended the
statute in 2006 to require registration on a biannual basis.  Any attempt to
insert a notification requirement into section 23-3-460 would run contrary to
the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute.  See State v. Brannon,
379 S.C. 487, 496, 666 S.E.2d 272, 276 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The words of a
statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to
subtle or forced construction.").  Thus, the State provided substantial
direct evidence proving Anderson was guilty of failing to register as a sex
offender because Detective Catlett testified Anderson did not register on May
5, 2007, as required by statute.  See State v. Weston, 367 S.C.
279, 292-93, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("If there is any direct evidence
or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the
guilt of the accused, the [appellate court] must find the case was properly
submitted to the jury.").  Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied
Anderson's motion for directed verdict.          

3. As
to whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding Anderson's
failure to provide an updated address as required by statute, Anderson's
challenge to Catlett's statement on the basis of a prior bad act is not
preserved for our review because Anderson did not object to the statement on
this basis before the trial court.  See Dunbar, 356 S.C. at 142,
587 S.E.2d at 693 ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate
review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge."). 
Regarding the inadmissibility of the statement on the basis of hearsay, we hold
the trial court correctly admitted Catlett's testimony.  The statement did not
qualify as hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted – whether Anderson failed to register in the past.    Instead, the
statement was offered to explain how Catlett conducted her investigation.  See Rule 801(c), SCRE (stating hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted).   

4. As
to whether the trial court erred in admitting Catlett's testimony regarding a
form signed by Anderson, we find this issue is abandoned.  See Rule 208(b)(1)(D),
SCACR ("[T]he particular issue to be addressed shall be set forth in
distinctive type, followed by discussion and citations of authority."); Hunt v. Forestry Comm'n, 358 S.C. 564, 573, 595 S.E.2d 846,
851 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Issues raised in a brief but not supported by
authority are deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal.").  Additionally, the admission of Catlett's statement was
harmless and did not prejudice Anderson because it was cumulative to other
testimony offered by Catlett.  Catlett testified without objection that
Anderson was notified three times about the change in the registration
requirements.  See State v. Good, 308 S.C. 308, 311, 417 S.E.2d
640, 642 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding the admission of improper hearsay evidence is
harmless when it is merely cumulative to other evidence admitted without
objection). 

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS,
PIEPER, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.