Cooper v. Leisure Connections Travel

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Robin Cooper
& Carol Jean Correll, Respondents,

v.

Leisure
Connections Travel, Inc., Appellant.

Appeal From Horry County

Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-524

Submitted December 1, 2010 – Filed
December 13, 2010 

AFFIRMED

Randall K. Mullins and Jarrod E. Ownbey,
of N. Myrtle Beach, for Appellant.

Jean Correll, of Silver Springs, Maryland,
and Robin Cooper, of Bowie, Maryland, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Leisure Connections Travel, Inc. (LCT) appeals the
order of the circuit court affirming the magistrate court’s order awarding
damages to Respondents Robin Cooper and Carol Jean Correll.  On appeal, LCT
argues the circuit court erred in affirming the magistrate court on the
following grounds: (1) consolidating the cases; (2) finding res judicata and
collateral estoppel inapplicable to Cooper's claim in South Carolina following
a Maryland judgment; (3) charging the jury on the South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act, fraud, and the issue of agency; (4) allowing testimony that
Fantasy Vacations, Inc. and LCT are the same entity under the theory of respondeat
superior; (5) denying LCT's motion for a mistrial based on Respondents'
improper statements during closing arguments; (6) failing to join Fantasy
Vacations, Inc. as a necessary and proper party defendant; and (7) allowing
joint testimony by the Respondents under Rules 404(b) and 406 of the South
Carolina Rules of Evidence. 

 We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: As to Issue 1, see Alcorn v. Ford Motor Co., 276 S.C. 180, 182, 276 S.E.2d 925,
926 (1981) (finding the purpose of consolidation is to prevent the
multiplicity of litigation, to save the parties unnecessary costs, to conserve
court time and space, and to clear congested court dockets); Keels v. Pierce, 315
S.C. 339, 342, 433 S.E.2d 902, 904 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating that a court
may order consolidation, absent an abuse of discretion, whenever there are
actions pending before the court that involve a common question of law or fact); as to
Issue 2, see State v. Bacote, 331 S.C. 328, 331, 503 S.E.2d
161, 163 (1998) ("In the context of a default judgment, collateral estoppel
or issue preclusion does not apply because an essential element of that
doctrine requires that the claim sought to be precluded actually have been
litigated in the earlier litigation.") (citation omitted); S.C. Dep't
of Soc. Servs. v. Basnight, 346 S.C. 241, 249, 551 S.E.2d 274,
278 (Ct. App. 2001) (stating res judicata not only precludes relitigation
of those issues which were actually litigated in the first suit, but also
relitigation of issues that might have been litigated in the first
action) (emphasis added); as to issue 3, see Johnson v. Horry Cnty.
Solid Waste Auth., 389 S.C. 528, 538, 698 S.E.2d 835, 840 (Ct. App.
2010) (holding the appellate court "must consider the court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial") (internal
quotations and citation omitted); as to Issue 5, see Vestry & Church
Wardens of Church of Holy Cross v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 384 S.C.
441, 446-47, 682 S.E.2d 489, 492 (2009) (stating the trial court, absent
an abuse of discretion, should declare a mistrial only when absolutely
necessary and when the moving
party has shown error and resulting prejudice); as
to all remaining issues on appeal, see Jones v. Lott, 387
S.C. 339, 346, 692 S.E.2d 900, 903 (2010) ("Issues and arguments are preserved for appellate review only when they are raised to and ruled on by the lower
court.").

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, PIEPER, and
GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.