State v. Hemingway-Cox

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR
RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2),
SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Gregory Hemingway-Cox, Appellant.

Appeal From Horry County

Thomas W. Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2010-UP-557 

Submitted December 1, 2010 – Filed
December 23, 2010

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Gregory
Hemingway-Cox appeals his convictions for first-degree burglary, kidnapping,
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, and possession of a weapon
during the commission of a violent crime, arguing the circuit court erroneously
(1) admitted identification testimony influenced by an unduly suggestive
confrontation procedure and (2) relied on the victim's unreliable
identification in denying his motions for directed verdicts.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.  As to whether the circuit court erred
in finding the identification procedure based on third party information was
not unduly suggestive and admitting the identification testimony: State v.
Moore, 343 S.C. 282, 287, 540 S.E.2d 445, 447 (2000) (holding a court must
first ascertain whether a confrontation procedure was unduly suggestive when
determining whether an in-court identification violates due process); State
v. Tisdale, 338 S.C. 607, 611-12, 527 S.E.2d 389, 392 (Ct. App. 2000)
(holding suggestiveness arising from nongovernmental sources does not violate
due process).

2. As to whether the
circuit court erred in denying Hemingway-Cox's motion for directed verdicts: State v. Adams,
332 S.C. 139, 144-45, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding if a defendant presents evidence after the denial
of his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case, in order to preserve the
issue for appeal, he must make another motion for a
directed verdict at the close of all evidence).  Alternatively, we affirm on the merits: State v. Parler,
217 S.C. 24, 26, 59 S.E.2d 489, 489 (1950) (noting that a motion for directed
verdict should have been made by the appellant at the close of all evidence,
but waiving the appellant's failure to do so and considering the issue on its
merits because the conviction and sentence involved the liberty of the
appellant).

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS,
PIEPER, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.