State v. Stackhouse

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jonathan Stackhouse, Appellant.

Appeal From Horry County

Thomas W. Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2010-UP-569

Submitted December 1, 2010 – Filed
December 31, 2010

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster,
Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney
General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe,
all of Columbia; and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Jonathan
Stackhouse appeals his convictions for first-degree burglary, kidnapping, and
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, arguing the circuit court
erroneously (1) admitted identification testimony influenced by an unduly
suggestive confrontation procedure and (2) relied on the victim's unreliable
identification in denying his motion for directed verdicts.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the circuit court erred
in finding the identification procedure based on third party information was
not unduly suggestive and admitting the identification testimony: State v.
Moore, 343 S.C. 282, 287, 540 S.E.2d 445, 447 (2000) (holding a court must
first ascertain whether a confrontation procedure was unduly suggestive when
determining whether an in-court identification violates due process); State
v. Tisdale, 338 S.C. 607, 611-12, 527 S.E.2d 389, 392 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding
suggestiveness arising from nongovernmental sources does not violate due
process).

2. As to whether the
circuit court erred in denying Stackhouse's motion for directed verdicts: State v. Adams,
332 S.C. 139, 144-45, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding if a defendant presents evidence after the denial
of his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case, in order to preserve the
issue for appeal, he must make another motion for a
directed verdict at the close of all evidence).  Alternatively, we affirm on the merits: State v. Parler,
217 S.C. 24, 26, 59 S.E.2d 489, 489 (1950) (noting that a motion for directed
verdict should have been made by the appellant at the close of all evidence,
but waiving the appellant's failure to do so and considering the issue on its
merits because the conviction and sentence involved the liberty of the
appellant).

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS,
PIEPER, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.