Riley v. Osmose Holdings

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Clyde L. Riley,
Jr., and Chere J. Riley, Appellants,

v.

Osmose
Holdings, Inc., d/b/a Osmose, Inc.; Arch Wood Protection, Inc.; Chemical
Specialties, Inc.; Cox Industries, Inc.; Buck Lumber and Building Supply,
Inc., d/b/a Charleston Wood Industries; New South Wood Preserving, LLC;
Collum's Lumber Products LLC; Spartanburg Forest Products, Inc.; East Coast
Lumber Company, Inc.; Georgia-Pacific Corporation; Southern Lumber &
Millwork Corp.; Hughes Lumber & Building Supply; G.S. Carter & Son
Lumber Company; Lowe's Companies; 84 Lumber Company, Defendants,

of whom Buck Lumber
and Building Supply, Inc. is, Respondent.

Appeal From Charleston County

Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-450

Submitted October 1, 2010 – Filed October
19, 2010   

AFFIRMED

William K. Austin, of Charleston, South
Carolina; Davis S. McCrea, of Bloomington, Indiana, for Appellant.

Morgan S. Templeton, of Charleston, South
Carolina, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Clyde L. Riley, Jr. and Chere J. Riley (the Rileys)
appeal the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Buck Lumber
& Building Supply, Inc. d/b/a Charleston Wood Industries (Buck Lumber). The
Rileys argue the circuit court erred in finding: (1) the Rileys abandoned their
two causes of action for breach of warranty; and (2) the Rileys' claims were
barred by the statute of limitations. 

We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. §
36-2-725 (2003) (stating a cause of action for breach of warranty has a statute
of limitations of six years and begins running when "the breach is or
should have been discovered") (emphasis added); Rule 40(j), SCRCP ("A
party may strike its complaint . . . from any docket one time as a matter of
right, provided that all parties adverse to that claim . . . agree in writing
that it may be stricken, and all further agree that if the claim is restored
upon motion made within 1 year of the date stricken, the statute of limitations
shall be tolled as to all consenting parties during the time the case is
stricken . . . ."); Maxwell v. Genez, 356 S.C. 617, 620-21,
591 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2003) ("Rule 40(j) does not require that a party
move to restore the case to the docket within one year after it was stricken. 
Instead, the unambiguous language provides that, if the claim is restored
within one year after it is stricken, the statute of limitations is tolled for
that period."); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an "appellate
court need not address remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is
dispositive").     

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, PIEPER, and
KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.