In the Interest of Tremaine H.

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

In The Interest
of Tremaine H., A Juvenile Under The Age Of Seventeen, Appellant.

Appeal From Georgetown County

R. Wright Turbeville, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-336

Submitted June 1, 2010 – Filed June 29,
2010   

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H.
Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Deborah R. J. Shupe, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Tremaine H. appeals being adjudicated
delinquent for second-degree lynching, arguing the family court erred in
refusing to direct a verdict in his favor on the charge because the State
failed to prove the acts of violence emanated from a premeditated purpose or intent.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following
authorities:  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-220 (2003) (defining second-degree lynching
as an act of violence inflicted by a mob upon an individual not resulting in
the individual's death); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-230 (2003) (defining mob
"as the assemblage of two or more persons, without color or authority of
law, for the premeditated purpose and with the premeditated intent of
committing an act of violence upon the person of another"); State v. Frazier,
386 S.C. 526, 531, 689 S.E.2d 610, 613 (2010) (providing when reviewing the
denial of a directed verdict motion, the appellate court views the evidence and
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State and finding
the denial of a directed verdict motion is proper when any direct evidence or
substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of
the accused exists); State v. Smith, 352 S.C. 133, 137-38, 572 S.E.2d
473, 475-76 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding the State must produce some evidence of
premeditated intent to sustain a conviction for lynching, premeditation cannot
be spontaneous, and the State can establish the intent element of lynching
through positive testimonial evidence or circumstantial inferences).

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and
LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.