SCDSS v. Doe

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Social Services, Respondent,

v.

Jane Doe, Appellant,

And John Roe
and Richard Roe, Respondents.

Appeal From Fairfield County

 Brian M. Gibbons, Family Court Judge

 Joseph W. McGowan, III, Family Court
Judge

2007-DR-20-00202

Unpublished Opinion No.  2010-UP-244

Submitted April 1, 2010 – Filed April 20,
2010

AFFIRMED

Jane Doe, pro se, of Batesburg and of Louisville, Kentucky, for
Appellant.

Angela Michelle Killian, of Lancaster, for Respondent South
Carolina Department of Social Services.

Emma I. Bryson and Ken H. Lester, of Columbia, for Respondent John
Roe.

Lesley Williams Sercer, of Columbia, for Respondent Richard Roe.

Larry Jerome Pearson, of Columbia, for Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM:  Jane Doe
(Mother) appeals the family court's removal of her son (Son) and daughters (Daughters)
and their placement into the custody of the South Carolina Department of Social
Services (DSS). 

Mother
appeals multiple orders of the family court related to the removal of Son and Daughters.
 However, she articulates arguments against only two orders: (1) a September 2007
order finding Mother psychologically abused Son, removing Son, and taking Daughters
into emergency protective custody and (2) a December 2007 order removing Daughters. 
Accordingly, this opinion focuses solely on the removal orders.  Mother's
appellate brief states custody of the children has gone to their respective
fathers, John Roe and Richard Roe (collectively, the Fathers), following
private custody actions. 

Mother
argues (1) the family court erred in finding "spiritual coercion through
prayer" was psychological abuse; (2) the family court erred in failing to
find Son's mental injury was proven by clear and convincing evidence; (3) she
was deprived of her due process rights in numerous ways; and (4) the family
court removal orders are not supported by sufficient facts in violation of Rule
26(a), SCRFC.  DSS and the Fathers contend the appeal is moot because any
ruling will have no legal effect when the children's legal custody was decided
in private custody actions.  We find a preponderance of the evidence supported
removal, and we affirm for the following reasons:

1.  As to whether the appeal is moot,
we find the appeal is not moot because Mother's name was ordered to be placed
on the Central Registry for Abuse and Neglect as a result of Son's removal
order.  See Mathis v. S.C. State Highway Dep't, 260 S.C. 344,
346, 195 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1973) ("A case becomes moot when judgment, if
rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon existing
controversy."); Collins Music Co. v. IGT, 365 S.C. 544, 549, 619
S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2005) (explaining an exception to the mootness doctrine
exists when the trial court's decision has collateral consequences to the
parties).  However, insofar as the children's custody has been determined in
private custody actions, the appeal is moot.  See McCoy v. McCoy,
283 S.C. 383, 385-86, 323 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1984) (holding an appeal of a family
court order granting temporary custody to DSS was moot when a subsequent
divorce action determined custody of the child).

2.  Regarding Mother's arguments
concerning prayer, the evidentiary standard for finding a mental injury, and
deprivation of due process, we find these issues are not preserved for our
review.  See King v. King, 384 S.C. 134, 142, 681 S.E.2d 609, 614
(Ct. App. 2009) (finding for an issue to be preserved it must have been raised
to and ruled upon by the trial court).  We note Mother objected at Daughters'
removal hearing to psychologist Dr. DeFelice's testimony, arguing it was speculative,
prejudicial, and inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404(b), SCRE. 
However, Mother asserts on appeal the testimony was irrelevant hearsay that
violated her due process rights.  Accordingly, the issue is not preserved for
review on appeal.  See Wogan v. Kunze, 366 S.C. 583, 608-09, 623
S.E.2d 107, 121 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding a party may not argue one theory
before the trial court and another on appeal).

3.  As to whether the family court violated
Rule 26(a), SCRFC, we find the orders adequately provided the factual bases and
legal conclusions for their decisions.  See Rule 26(a), SCRFC ("An
order or judgment pursuant to an adjudication in a domestic relations case
shall set forth the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law to support
the court's decision.").

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the family court's orders removing
Son and Daughters.

AFFIRMED. [1]

WILLIAMS,
KONDUROS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1]  We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.