State v. Rickey Brown

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Rickey Brown, Appellant.

Appeal from Richland County

Michelle J. Childs, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-204

Submitted January 4, 2010 – Filed March
12, 2010   

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,
Assistant Attorney General A. West Lee, of Columbia, and Solicitor, Fifth Judicial
Circuit, Warren B. Giese, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Rickey
Brown was convicted of criminal sexual
conduct with a minor in the second degree.  The trial court sentenced him to
five years imprisonment and credited Brown with fourteen months for time
served.  Brown appeals arguing the trial court's sentence was disproportionate
and excessive given the circumstances of the offense and of the offender.

We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR and the following authorities: State v. Cox,
328 S.C. 371, 373, 492 S.E.2d 399, 400 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing State v.
Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) (defendant  and the State must
make a contemporaneous objection in order to preserve an alleged error for
appellate review); State v. Johnson, 333 S.C. 459, 462, 510 S.E.2d 423,
425 (1999) (noting that, if an exceptional circumstance is presented, a
sentence may be set aside on appeal even if an objection has not been made at
trial); Article 1, section 15 of the South Carolina State Constitution (stating
that, "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed, nor shall cruel,
nor corporal, nor unusual punishment be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be
unreasonably detained."); State
v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 354, 46
S.E.2d 273, 275-76 (1948) ("[t]he weight of authority is to the effect
that if the statute fixing the punishment for an offense is not
unconstitutional, a sentence within the limits prescribed by such statute will
not be regarded as cruel and unusual"; and the court did not have
jurisdiction to "correct a sentence on the ground that it is excessive
when it is within the limits prescribed by law for the discretion of the trial
Judge (sic) and is not the result of partiality, prejudice, oppression or
corrupt motive."); State v. Kiser, 288 S.C. 441, 443, 343 S.E.2d
292, 293 (1986) (outlining the three objective criteria to be considered when
reviewing sentences for proportionality);
S.C. Code Ann. section 16-3-655 (B) and (C)(3) (2003) (defining the crime of
criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree and the sentence that
must be imposed).[1]

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, A.C.J., GEATHERS, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.