Stanley Dale Floyd v. SSC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Stanley Dale Floyd and Stephanie Floyd, Respondents,

v.

SSC Sumter East Operating Company, LLC d/b/a Sumter
East Health and Rehab Center; SSC Equity Holdings,
LLC; SavaSeniorCare, LLC; SavaSeniorCare
Administrative and Consulting, LLC; SavaSeniorCare
Consulting, LLC; SMV Sumter East, LLC; and Natasha
Nadkarni, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001126

Appeal From Sumter County
Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-276
Submitted July 17, 2024 – Filed July 24, 2024

AFFIRMED

David Lee Williford, II, and Timothy Maio, both of Huff,
Powell & Bailey, LLC, of Greenville, for Appellants.

Matthew W. Christian, of Christian & Christian, LLC, of
Greenville; and Jordan Christopher Calloway, of
McGowan Hood Felder & Phillips, of Rock Hill, all for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: SSC Sumter East Operating Company, LLC d/b/a Sumter East
Health and Rehab Center (the Facility); SSC Equity Holdings, LLC;
SavaSeniorCare, LLC; SavaSeniorCare Administrative and Consulting, LLC;
SavaSeniorCare Consulting, LLC; SMV Sumter East, LLC; and Natasha Nadkarni
(collectively, Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order denying the Facility and
Nadkarni's motion to compel arbitration and the remaining Appellants' motions to
stay the case pending arbitration. On appeal, Appellants argue the circuit court
erred by denying the motion to compel arbitration because Stephanie Floyd
(Stephanie) is bound by the Arbitration Agreement she signed in connection with
the admission of her husband, Stanley Dale Floyd (Dale), to the Facility, and thus,
she is required to arbitrate her loss of consortium claim. We affirm pursuant to
Rule 220(b), SCACR.

Assuming arguendo, the Arbitration Agreement was authentic and not ambiguous,
and that proper consideration was given, we hold the circuit court did not err by
denying the Facility's motion to compel arbitration because the Arbitration
Agreement is not enforceable as to Stephanie. See Zabinski v. Bright Acres
Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) ("The question of the
arbitrability of a claim is an issue for judicial determination, unless the parties
provide otherwise."); New Hope Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders,
379 S.C. 620, 625, 667 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Appeal from the denial of a
motion to compel arbitration is subject to de novo review."); Stokes v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 351 S.C. 606, 609-10, 571 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 2002) ("However,
the circuit court's factual findings will not be overruled if there is any evidence
reasonably supporting them.").

Here, Stephanie signed paperwork on Dale's behalf in connection with his
admission to the Facility while Dale was being transported from the hospital to the
Facility. Two of the documents presented to Stephanie were purportedly an
Admissions Agreement and an Arbitration Agreement. The Arbitration Agreement
explained the Facility had "a program to resolve disagreements with residents and
their families or legal representatives called the Dispute Resolution Program," and
that "BY AGREEING TO HAVE ALL DISAGREEMENTS RESOLVED
THROUGH THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM, THE PARTIES
AGREE TO WAIVE THE RIGHT TO A JUDGE OR A JURY TRIAL AND TO
HAVE THE DISPUTE RESOLVED THROUGH VARIOUS STEPS,
CULMINATING IN A DECISION BY AN ARBITRATOR." The Arbitration
Agreement contained three sections for signature—the first was intended for the
resident's signature if the resident was competent, but it had a separate line for a
representative to sign if the resident was mentally competent but physically unable
to sign the Arbitration Agreement, the second and third sections were intended for
signatures of a legal representative or family member if the resident was "adjudged
incompetent." The second and third sections also stated, "In signing this
Agreement, the Legal Representative or Family Member binds both the Resident
and themselves individually," and provided a signature line for the "Signature of
Legal Representative or Family Member." After a short stay at the Facility, Dale
returned to the hospital. Subsequently, Stephanie and Dale served and filed a
complaint against Appellants, and Stephanie specifically asserted a cause of action
for loss of consortium. The Appellants then filed their respective motions to
compel arbitration and stay the proceedings until arbitration was complete. The
circuit court denied Appellants' motions. First, it explained there was "no evidence
that [Dale] was not competent or not able to sign any documents on his own
behalf"—a finding not challenged on appeal—and found Stephanie had no
authority to bind Dale to the Arbitration Agreement and that the Admission
Agreement and Arbitration Agreement did not merge; thus, the Arbitration
Agreement was not enforceable against Dale. It also found, among other things,
that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable against Stephanie because "the
terms of the Agreement required [Dale], not [Stephanie] to sign." On appeal,
Appellants do not challenge the circuit court's finding's that Dale is not bound by
the Arbitration Agreement, rather, they solely argue Stephanie should be
compelled to arbitrate her loss of consortium claim. We find that under the terms
of the third signature section—the section Stephanie signed—Stephanie would
only be bound if (1) she signed and (2) Dale was "adjudged incompetent."
Because the circuit court found Dale was competent, the conditions necessary to
bind Stephanie were not present. Thus, she is not bound by the Arbitration
Agreement. See Stokes, 351 S.C. at 609-10, 571 S.E.2d at 713 ("However, the
circuit court's factual findings will not be overruled if there is any evidence
reasonably supporting them."); S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. M & T Enterprises of Mt.
Pleasant, LLC, 379 S.C. 645, 655, 667 S.E.2d 7, 13 (Ct. App. 2008) ("When a
contract is unambiguous, clear, and explicit, it must be construed according to the
terms the parties have used, to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary, and
popular sense.").

AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.