State v. Ronald Wood, Jr.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Ronald Wood, Jr., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000888

Appeal From Lexington County
Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-036
Submitted January 1, 2024 – Filed January 31, 2024

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Breen Richard Stevens, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior
Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, all
of Columbia; and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard, III, of
Lexington, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Ronald Wood, Jr., appeals his conviction for first-degree
burglary and his sentence of twenty-three years' imprisonment. On appeal, Wood
argues the trial court erred in failing to suppress the out-of-court and in-court
identifications of Wood by an eyewitness when the eyewitness was in close
proximity to the perpetrator but provided merely generic descriptions of the
perpetrator's clothing, age, gender, and race and failed to provide any details about
the perpetrator's face or Wood's distinctive tattoos. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.

We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the
eyewitness's out-of-court identification of Wood. See State v. Liverman, 398 S.C.
130, 138, 727 S.E.2d 422, 425 (2012) ("Generally, the decision to admit an
eyewitness identification is at the trial judge's discretion and will not be disturbed
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."); id. at 138, 727 S.E.2d at 426 ("Due
process requires courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether the
identification resulted from unnecessary and unduly suggestive police procedures,
and if so, whether the out-of-court identification was nevertheless so reliable that
no substantial likelihood of misidentification existed."); State v. Brown, 356 S.C.
496, 502-03, 589 S.E.2d 781, 784 (Ct. App. 2003) ("An in-court identification of
an accused is inadmissible if a suggestive out-of-court identification procedure
created a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."). Although
the identification procedure used by police was suggestive, it was not
unnecessarily suggestive because it occurred approximately two hours after the
incident, it was close in proximity to the burglary, the eyewitness's memory was
still fresh, Wood had not altered his appearance other than removing his black shirt
and holding it in his hand, and police had previously interacted with two other
suspects where the interaction terminated as soon as the eyewitness rejected them.
See State v. Moore, 343 S.C. 282, 287, 540 S.E.2d 445, 448 (2000) ("Single person
show-ups are particularly disfavored in the law."); State v. Mansfield, 343 S.C. 66,
78, 538 S.E.2d 257, 263 (Ct. App. 2000) ("While a [show-up] in which a witness
views a single suspect is generally suggestive, and hence suspect or disfavored,
and less preferable than a lineup, even if requested by accused, a [show-up] may be
proper in some circumstances." (quoting 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 803 (1989)));
State v. Wyatt, 421 S.C. 306, 313, 806 S.E.2d 708, 711 (2017) (explaining
suggestive police identification procedures may be necessary "where it occurs
shortly after the alleged crime, near the scene of the crime, as the witness' memory
is still fresh, and the suspect has not had time to alter his looks or dispose of
evidence, and the [show-up] may expedite the release of innocent suspects, and
enable the police to determine whether to continue searching" (quoting Gibbs v.
State, 403 S.C. 484, 494, 744 S.E.2d 170, 175 (2013))).
Even if the identification procedure used here was unnecessarily suggestive, the
eyewitness's identification was nevertheless so reliable it posed no substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See Moore, 343 S.C. at 287, 540 S.E.2d
at 448 ("Although one-on-one show-ups have been sharply criticized, and are
inherently suggestive, the identification need not be excluded as long as under all
the circumstances the identification was reliable notwithstanding any suggestive
procedure." (quoting Jefferson v. State, 425 S.E.2d 915, 918 (Ga. App. Ct. 1992)));
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972) ("[T]he factors to be considered in
evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of
attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation."). Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the factors weigh in favor of reliability because the burglary
occurred on a clear and sunny day; the eyewitness was able to observe the
perpetrator from a relatively close distance; the eyewitness paid close attention to
the perpetrator for the purpose of making an identification; the eyewitness's
identification was not inaccurate because although the eyewitness did not describe
the perpetrator as having tattoos, Wood matched the description when he was
found; the eyewitness immediately identified Wood when she arrived at the
location where Wood was detained; the eyewitness stated she knew Wood was the
perpetrator without a shadow of a doubt; and the identification was made just over
two hours after the eyewitness initially called 911. Because the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting the eyewitness's out-of-court identification, it did
not err by allowing the eyewitness' in-court identification. See Brown, 356 S.C. at
502-03, 589 S.E.2d at 784 ("An in-court identification of an accused is
inadmissible if a suggestive out-of-court identification procedure created a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.").

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.