State v. Donnielle K. Matthews

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Donnielle K. Matthews, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000677

Appeal From Horry County
Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-399
Submitted November 1, 2023 – Filed December 13, 2023

REVERSED

Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II,
of Conway, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Donnielle K. Matthews appeals her conviction for voluntary
manslaughter and sentence of thirty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Matthews
argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of
voluntary manslaughter, contending there was no evidence she acted in a sudden
heat of passion because she deliberately and intentionally stabbed Dennis Green
out of fear. We reverse pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

An Horry County grand jury indicted Matthews for the murder of her husband,
Dennis Green, who died of stab wounds following an altercation in the couple's
car. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, murder, and, over
Matthews's objection, voluntary manslaughter.

We hold the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on voluntary
manslaughter. See Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539
(2000) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision regarding jury
instructions unless the trial court abused its discretion."). Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to Matthews, we hold there was no evidence presented
from which a juror could reasonably infer Matthews acted in the sudden heat of
passion. Although there was evidence Green provoked Matthews by forcibly
pulling her from the back seat into the front floorboard of their car and hitting her
repeatedly, the evidence did not show Green lacked control over her actions or
acted under an uncontrollable impulse to do violence, despite her fear, when she
stabbed Green. See State v. Niles, 412 S.C. 515, 522, 772 S.E.2d 877, 880 (2015)
("When determining whether the evidence requires a charge on voluntary
manslaughter, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the
defendant."); State v. Cole, 338 S.C. 97, 101, 525 S.E.2d 511, 513 (2000)
("Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in sudden heat
of passion upon sufficient legal provocation."); State v. Sams, 410 S.C. 303, 309,
764 S.E.2d 511, 514 (2014) (explaining a sudden heat of passion "must be such as
would naturally disturb the sway of reason and render the mind of an ordinary
person incapable of cool reflection and produce what may be called an
uncontrollable impulse to do violence."); State v. Starnes, 388 S.C. 590, 599-600,
698 S.E.2d 604, 609 (2010) (concluding the defendant was not entitled to a
voluntary manslaughter instruction even though he testified he was in fear when he
shot the victims because there was no evidence he was "out of control as a result of
his fear or was acting under an uncontrollable impulse to do violence"). Here,
Matthews testified she stabbed Green in self-defense when he refused to stop
hitting her despite her telling him to stop. She explained Green was still hitting her
"even after [she] had swung the knife." Moreover, Green had only two stab
wounds, which a crime scene reconstruction expert characterized as "shallow" and
"little poke wounds." See State v. Smith, 391 S.C. 408, 413, 706 S.E.2d 12, 15
(2011) (concluding the defendant was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter
instruction because "he was not enraged, incapable of 'cool reflection,' or acting
'under an uncontrollable impulse to do violence'" at the time of killing; thus, he did
not act in the sudden heat of passion). Although Matthews may not have been
calm when she arrived at the hospital less than ten minutes after the stabbing,
Matthews was composed enough to drive Green to the hospital immediately
following the stabbing. See State v. Sims, 426 S.C. 115, 137-39, 825 S.E.2d 731,
742-43 (Ct. App. 2019) (holding there was no evidence Sims shot her husband in a
sudden heat of passion when the evidence showed Sims, although afraid,
"deliberately and intentionally" shot him after telling him to stop what he was
doing, which "indicat[ed] she did not want to use the gun," and as soon as she shot
him she began "immediately" administering CPR and called 911). Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Matthews, we hold there was no evidence
presented from which a juror could reasonably infer Matthews lacked control over
her actions at the time of the stabbing. Thus, the trial court erred. See State v.
Geiger, 370 S.C. 600, 607, 635 S.E.2d 669, 673 (Ct. App. 2006) ("To justify
charging the lesser crime, the evidence presented must allow a rational inference
the defendant was guilty only of the lesser offense."). Further, because the jury
found Matthews guilty of the erroneous charge, the trial court's error in instructing
the jury on voluntary manslaughter was not harmless. See State v. Middleton, 407
S.C. 312, 317, 755 S.E.2d 432, 435 (2014) ("When considering whether an error
with respect to a jury instruction was harmless, we must 'determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.'"
(quoting State v. Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 144-45, 498 S.E.2d 212, 218 (Ct. App.
1998))).

REVERSED. 1

MCDONALD and VINSON, JJ., and BROMELL HOLMES, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.