Arthur Graveline v. Brenda Gorski 2

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Arthur J. Graveline, Respondent,

v.

Brenda Gorski, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000112

Appeal From Horry County
Melissa J. Buckhannon, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-367
Submitted October 1, 2023 – Filed November 15, 2023

AFFIRMED

Brenda Gorski, of Pawleys Island, pro se.

Thomas Jarrett Bouchette and Marissa Noelle Drost, both
of The Floyd Law Firm PC, of Surfside Beach, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Brenda Gorski, pro se, appeals the family court's order finding
her in contempt. Gorski argues the family court (1) abused its discretion by
denying her motion for a continuance, (2) abused its discretion throughout the
contempt hearing and in sentencing her to incarceration during the COVID-19
pandemic, and (3) acted prejudicially against her during the contempt hearing. We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to Issue One, we find the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Gorski's motion for a continuance. See Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 91, 833
S.E.2d 266, 272 (2019) ("Appellate courts review family court matters de novo,
with the exceptions of evidentiary and procedural rulings."); Sellers v. Nicholls,
432 S.C. 101, 113, 851 S.E.2d 54, 60 (Ct. App. 2020) ("A motion for a
continuance is a procedural matter involving the progress of a case."); id. at 114,
851 S.E.2d at 60-61 ("[An appellate court] will not set aside a judge's ruling on a
motion for a continuance unless it clearly appears there was an abuse of discretion
to the prejudice of the movant." (emphasis in original) (quoting Townsend v.
Townsend, 323 S.C. 309, 313, 474 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1996))); State v. Lytchfield,
230 S.C. 405, 409, 95 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1957) ("[R]eversals of refusal of
continuance are about as rare as the proverbial hens' teeth."). First, although
Gorski alleged in her rule to show cause that Graveline violated the tax provision
of the family court's final order, which pertained to the parties' 2017 taxes, this did
not amount to "good and sufficient cause" for the family court to grant the
continuance. See Rule 2(a), SCRFC ("[T]he South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure (SCRCP) shall be applicable in domestic relations actions to the extent
permitted by Rule 81, SCRCP."); Rule 40(i)(1), SCRCP ("If good and sufficient
cause for continuance is shown, the continuance may be granted by the court.").
At the time Gorski filed her continuance motion, she had not yet filed her rule to
show cause, and the family court did not issue a rule to show cause against
Graveline until the day before the contempt hearing. Although the family court
considered the issue of the amount Graveline owed Gorski under the tax provision
at the contempt hearing, it sustained Graveline's objections to testimony
concerning his alleged violations under this provision. Furthermore, Gorski failed
to show she was prejudiced by the family court's denial of her continuance motion
when the court considered Graveline's credit related to the parties' 2017 taxes in
reducing the total amount she owed to Graveline. Second, as to Gorski's
allegations in her rule to show cause concerning Graveline's withholding of marital
property, the family court did not consider any evidence related to these allegations
at the contempt hearing and this evidence was not relevant to the allegations raised
in Graveline's rule to show cause. Lastly, as to Gorski's allegations in her rule to
show cause concerning alimony modification, the family court correctly found
Gorski would have to seek an alimony modification in a separate action. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 20-3-170(A) (2014) ("Whenever any husband or wife, pursuant to a
judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, has been required to make his
or her spouse any periodic payments of alimony and the circumstances of the
parties or the financial ability of the spouse making the periodic payments shall
have changed since the rendition of such judgment, either party may apply to the
court which rendered the judgment for an order and judgment decreasing or
increasing the amount of such alimony payments or terminating such payments
. . . .").

2. As to Issue Two, we find this issue is abandoned on appeal because Gorski
failed to present an argument or cite to any authority. See State v. Lindsey, 394
S.C. 354, 363, 714 S.E.2d 554, 558 (Ct. App. 2011) ("An issue is deemed
abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief
but not supported by authority."); Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348
S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001) ("South Carolina law clearly
states that short, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are
deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review."). Gorski's
incorporation by reference of her arguments and supporting authority under Issue
One fails to provide relevant support to her assertion set forth under Issue Two
because the authority Gorski cites in support of her argument under Issue One only
addresses continuances.

3. As to Issue Three, we find this issue is without merit. See State v. Jones, 325
S.C. 310, 317, 479 S.E.2d 517, 521 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding the circuit court "has
the inherent authority to maintain order in the courtroom"). The record reflects
that the family court merely cautioned Gorski to not speak over it so that the court
reporter would be able to accurately transcribe the record and gave Gorski
instruction when she failed to act pursuant to court rules and state law. See Rule
43(i), SCRCP ("Counsel shall not attempt to further argue any matter after he has
been heard and the ruling of the court has been pronounced."). The family court
gave Gorski the opportunity to raise objections, review Graveline's exhibits, and
examine witnesses.

AFFIRMED. 1

MCDONALD and VINSON, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.