Craig Chappell v. Ladle Soups

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(D)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Teri Chappell, as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Craig Chappell, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Appellant,

v.

Ladles Soups - James Island, LLC; Ladlessoups, LLC;
Ladles Soups at Cane Bay, LLC; Ladles Soups at Citadel
Mall, LLP; Ladles Soups Calhoun, LLC; Ladles Soups
Cane Bay, LLC; Ladles Soups Coosaw, LLC; Ladles
Soups Downtown Charleston, LLC; Ladlessoups Fresh
Fields, LLC; Ladles Soups @ Freshfields Village, LLC;
Ladlessoups Mainstreet, LLC; Ladles Soups Moncks
Corner, LLC; Ladlessoups Mount Pleasant, LLC; Ladles
Franchise Development, LLC; Ladles Franchising, Inc.;
Ladles Fort Mill, LLC; Ladles Knightsville, LLC; Ladles
West Ashley; Teri Owens; Sue Allen; Tracy Allen; Steve
Traeger; Erik Dyke; Julie Dyke; Stan Sutton; Carol
Sutton; Jason Dalter; Kellie Henderson; Jane Doe 1-25
(Unknown Operating Company and Management
Company Owners); John Doe 25-40 (Management
Personnel), Defendants,

Of Which Ladlessoups Mount Pleasant, LLC, Erik Dyke,
and Julie Dyke, are Respondents.

and

Teri Chappell, as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Craig Chappell, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Appellant,
v.

Ladles Soups - James Island, LLC; Ladlessoups, LLC;
Ladles Soups at Cane Bay, LLC; Ladles Soups at Citadel
Mall, LLP; Ladles Soups Calhoun, LLC; Ladles Soups
Cane Bay, LLC; Ladles Soups Coosaw, LLC; Ladles
Soups Downtown Charleston, LLC; Ladlessoups Fresh
Fields, LLC; Ladles Soups @ Freshfields Village, LLC;
Ladlessoups Mainstreet, LLC; Ladles Soups Moncks
Corner, LLC; Ladles Franchise Development, LLC;
Ladles Franchising, Inc.; Ladles Fort Mill, LLC; Ladles
Knightsville, LLC; Ladles West Ashley; Teri Owens;
Sue Allen; Tracy Allen; Steve Traeger; Erik Dyke; Julie
Dyke; Stan Sutton; Carol Sutton; Jack Dalter; Kellie
Henderson; Jane Doe 1-25 (Unknown Operating
Company and Management Company Owners); John
Doe 25-40 (Management Personnel), Defendants,

Of Which Ladles Franchising, Inc., Ladlessoups, LLC,
Sue Allen, and Tracy Allen, are Respondents.

and

Teri Chappell, as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Craig Chappell, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Appellant,

v.

Ladles Soups - James Island, LLC; Ladlessoups, LLC;
Ladles Soups at Cane Bay, LLC; Ladles Soups at Citadel
Mall, LLP; Ladles Soups Calhoun, LLC; Ladles Soups
Cane Bay, LLC; Ladles Soups Coosaw, LLC; Ladles
Soups Downtown Charleston, LLC; Ladlessoups Fresh
Fields, LLC; Ladles Soups @ Freshfields Village, LLC;
Ladlessoups Mainstreet, LLC; Ladles Soups Moncks
Corner, LLC; Ladles Franchise Development, LLC;
Ladles Franchising, Inc.; Ladles Fort Mill, LLC; Ladles
Knightsville, LLC; Ladles West Ashley; Teri Owens;
Sue Allen; Tracy Allen; Steve Traeger; Erik Dyke; Julie
Dyke; Stan Sutton; Carol Sutton; Jack Dalter; Kellie
Henderson; Jane Doe 1-25 (Unknown Operating
Company and Management Company Owners); John
Doe 25-40 (Management Personnel), Defendants,

Of Which Ladles Soups Coosaw, LLC, Ladles Soups
Downtown Charleston, LLC, Ladlessoups Fresh Fields,
LLC, Ladles Soups @ Freshfields Village, LLC, Ladles
Soups Moncks Corner, LLC, Ladles Franchise
Development, LLC, Ladles Fort Mill, LLC, Ladles
Knightsville, LLC, Ladles West Ashley, Steve Traeger,
Stan Sutton, Carol Sutton, and Kellie Henderson, are
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000201

Appeal From Charleston County
Bentley Price, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2023-UP-277
Heard May 9, 2023 – Filed August 2, 2023

AFFIRMED

Benjamin Scott Whaley Le Clercq and David D. Ashley,
both of the Le Clercq Law Firm, P.C., of Mount Pleasant,
for Appellant.

Peter Brandt Shelbourne, of Shelbourne Law Firm, of
Summerville, for Respondents Ladlessoups Mount
Pleasant, LLC, Erik Dyke, and Julie Dyke.

Kerry W. Koon, of Kerry W. Koon, Attorney at Law, and
Michael Evan Lacke, of Lacke Law Firm, LLC, both of
Charleston, for Respondents Ladles Franchising Inc.,
Ladlessoups, LLC, Sue Allen, and Tracy Allen.
Paul B. Ferrara, III, and Janel Kleinhardt Ferrara, both of
Ferrara Law Firm, PLLC, of North Charleston, for
Respondents Ladles Soups Coosaw, LLC, Ladles Soups
Downtown Charleston, LLC, Ladlessoups Fresh Fields,
LLC, Ladles Soups @ Freshfields Village, LLC, Ladles
Soups Moncks Corner, LLC, Ladles Franchise
Development, LLC, Ladles Fort Mill, LLC, Ladles
Knightsville, LLC, Ladles West Ashley, Steve Traeger,
Stan Sutton, Carol Sutton, and Kellie Henderson.

PER CURIAM: Teri Chappell (Appellant), as the Personal Representative of the
Estate of Craig Chappell,1 appeals circuit court orders granting summary judgment
to Respondents 2 in this class-action lawsuit against multiple locations and entities
of Ladles Soups. As to all Respondents, Appellant argues the circuit court erred in
(1) granting summary judgment because Appellant did not have a full and fair
opportunity to complete discovery and (2) finding Appellant lacked standing. As
to the Mount Pleasant Respondents and the Charleston Respondents, Appellant
argues the circuit court additionally erred in granting summary judgment because
the court had not heard Appellant's motion for class certification. As to the Mount
Pleasant Respondents and the Franchising Respondents, Appellant argues the
circuit court erred in not finding an issue of triable fact for the jury existed. As to
the Franchising Respondents, Appellant argues the circuit court erred in granting
summary judgment because the Franchising Respondents were employers liable
under the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act (SCPWA). 3 Finally, as to the

1
Chappell died on September 27, 2020, while these appeals were pending. Teri
Chappell was substituted as the Appellant by order filed January 7, 2021.
2
Ladlessoups Mount Pleasant, LLC, Erik Dyke, and Julie Dyke (the Mount
Pleasant Respondents); Ladles Franchising Inc., Ladlessoups, LLC, Sue Allen, and
Tracy Allen (the Franchising Respondents); Ladles Soups Coosaw LLC, Ladles
Soups Downtown Charleston, LLC, Ladlessoups Fresh Fields LLC, Ladles Soups
@ Freshfields Village, LLC, Ladles Soups Moncks Corner LLC, Ladles Franchise
Development, LLC, Ladles Fort Mill, LLC, Ladles Knightsville LLC, Ladles West
Ashley, Steve Traeger, Stan Sutton, Carol Sutton, and Kellie Henderson (the
Charleston Respondents) (collectively, Respondents).
3
S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10, et seq. (2021).
Charleston Respondents, Appellant argues the circuit court erred in failing to deem
admitted certain requests for admission. We affirm. 4

FACTS

Chappell was an employee at the Ladles Soups restaurant on James Island and was
paid an hourly wage, plus tips. Although Chappell worked for and earned credit
card and cash tips, he was allowed to retain only some cash tips while the
restaurant retained the credit card tips. Chappell asserted he was immediately
terminated when he complained about the policy of withholding credit card tips.

On February 14, 2018, Chappell brought a lawsuit against Respondents on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated, alleging class-action causes of action for
failure to pay wages under the SCPWA, breach of contract, and conversion.
Chappell alleged Ladles Soups, as part of a company-wide policy, wrongfully and
intentionally withheld credit card tips that were rightfully intended for himself and
others similarly situated in violation of the SCPWA. It is undisputed that Chappell
was an employee of Ladles Soups James Island only, and he was never employed
by any other Ladles Soups store. Each Ladles Soups is independently owned and
operated, and Chappell had no contractual relationship with any of the defendants
except Ladles Soups James Island, which is not a respondent in these appeals.

Numerous of the Respondents testified in depositions. Julie Dyke, co-owner with
Erik Dyke of Ladlessoups Mount Pleasant, LLC, testified that she and Erik were
the sole members of Ladlessoups Mount Pleasant, a separate franchise. Dyke
stated Chappell never worked at Ladlessoups Mount Pleasant. She testified that
each month, all credit card tips for Ladlessoups Mount Pleasant are "distributed
among all the employees based on how many hours they work." She also testified
she attended meetings once or twice a year with the Ladles Soups franchisor and
other Ladles Soups franchisees where a tipping policy and wages were discussed.
At an October 29, 2019 hearing, the Mount Pleasant Respondents' counsel stated
that they "turn over the tips, the credit card tips, through a bonus program to the
employees." Sue Allen, a Franchising Respondent and Chief Executive Officer of
Ladles Franchising, testified that while she owned Ladles Soups locations, she paid

4
We consolidate these appeals under appellate case number 2020-000201. See
Rule 214, SCACR ("Where there is more than one appeal from the same order,
judgment, or decree, or where the same question is involved in two or more
appeals in different cases, the appellate court may, in its discretion, order the
appeal to be consolidated.").
her employees hourly wages and retained the credit card tips to subsidize the
employees' hourly wage. The employees split the cash tips. However, Allen stated
there was no company-wide policy concerning the handling of credit card or cash
tips.

Non-respondents also testified in depositions. Corey Paul, a franchise owner,
testified that his employees did not get credit card tips, but they received cash tips
as an added bonus to their hourly wage. Paul explained that employees were hired
as non-tipped employees. Teri Owens, owner of Ladles Soups James Island, stated
the credit card tips went into the business to pay employees a higher pay rate and
the cash tips were kept by the employees.

Chappell filed a motion for an extension of time to serve the summons and
complaint on June 13, 2018, when he was unable to effect service on all parties.
The Mount Pleasant Respondents filed their answer to the complaint on June 20,
2018. The Franchising Respondents filed an answer on August 1, 2018. The
Charleston Respondents filed six separate answers on July 18 and 26, 2018.

On July 24, 2018, the Charleston Respondents filed a motion to disallow class
certification and a motion to dismiss improper parties pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court held a hearing on
the Charleston Respondents' motions to disallow class certification and to dismiss,
and the court denied the motions on January 29, 2019, by form orders. In denying
the motions, the court stated, "the Plaintiff[], despite filing the present action as a
'class action,' never moved . . . to certify the class." Respondents also filed motions
for summary judgment.5 On September 11, 2019, Chappell filed a motion for class
certification.

By orders issued January 7, 2020, the court denied Chappell's motion for class
certification by form order and granted the Mount Pleasant Respondents' motion
for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to the Franchising
Respondents and the Charleston Respondents by orders filed January 30, 2020, and
February 11, 2020. Chappell moved to reconsider the orders granting summary
judgment. The court denied the motion as to the Charleston Respondents, finding
no hearing was necessary. The records on appeal indicate no hearing was held or

5
The Mount Pleasant Respondents filed their motion on May 28, 2019; the
Franchising Respondents filed their motion on August 25, 2019; and the
Charleston Respondents filed their motion on August 21, 2019.
orders issued as to the Mount Pleasant Respondents and the Franchising
Respondents. These appeals follow.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts apply
the same standard as the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP." Dawkins v. Fields,
354 S.C. 58, 69, 580 S.E.2d 433, 438-39 (2003). "[S]ummary judgment is proper
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Montgomery v. CSX Transp., Inc., 376
S.C. 37, 47, 656 S.E.2d 20, 25 (2008). "In determining whether summary
judgment is appropriate, the evidence and its reasonable inferences must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Dawkins, 354 S.C. at 69, 580
S.E.2d at 439.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Discovery

Appellant argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because
Chappell did not have a full and fair opportunity to complete discovery. We
disagree.

Rule 56(e), SCRCP, provides:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does
not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him.

See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Batson, 345 S.C. 316, 320, 548 S.E.2d 854, 856 (2001)
(providing that Rule 56(e) "requires a party opposing summary judgment to come
forward with affidavits or other supporting documents demonstrating the existence
of a genuine issue for trial"); Schmidt v. Courtney, 357 S.C. 310, 317, 592 S.E.2d
326, 330 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Once the party moving for summary judgment meets
the initial burden of showing an absence of evidentiary support for the opponent's
case, the opponent cannot simply rest on mere allegations or denials contained in
the pleadings."); id. (requiring the nonmoving party to "come forward with specific
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial").

Although "summary judgment must not be granted until the opposing party has had
a full and fair opportunity to complete discovery[,]" the nonmoving party must
demonstrate the "likelihood that further discovery will uncover additional
[relevant] evidence" and the party must not be "merely engaged in a 'fishing
expedition.'" Baughman v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 112, 410 S.E.2d
537, 543-44 (1991). This court has explained:

A party claiming summary judgment is premature
because they have not been provided a full and fair
opportunity to conduct discovery must advance a good
reason why the time was insufficient under the facts of
the case, and why further discovery would uncover
additional relevant evidence and create a genuine issue of
material fact.

Guinan v. Tenet Healthsystems of Hilton Head, Inc., 383 S.C. 48, 54-55, 677
S.E.2d 32, 36 (Ct. App. 2009); see Savannah Bank, N.A. v. Stalliard, 400 S.C. 246,
253, 734 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2012) (finding the appellant "had ample time during
discovery to uncover evidence and speak with any potential witnesses . . . [and i]f
[the a]ppellant believed he did not have sufficient time, [the a]ppellant should have
promptly filed a motion seeking additional discovery time").

Viewing the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
Appellant, we find Chappell did not provide a sufficient reason why further
discovery might create a genuine issue for trial. Therefore, we find the circuit
court did not err in granting summary judgment. See Town of Hollywood v. Floyd,
403 S.C. 466, 477, 744 S.E.2d 161, 166 (2013) ("[I]t is not sufficient for a party to
create an inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact that is not genuine.").

II. Standing

Appellant argues the circuit court erred in finding Chappell lacked standing. We
disagree.

"Standing [is] a fundamental prerequisite to instituting an action . . . ." Youngblood
v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 402 S.C. 311, 317, 741 S.E.2d 515, 518 (2013). The
burden of proving standing is on the party seeking to establish it. Town of Arcadia
Lakes v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Env't Control, 404 S.C. 515, 529, 745 S.E.2d 385,
392 (Ct. App. 2013). "Standing . . . may exist by statute, through the principles of
constitutional standing, or through the public importance exception." Youngblood,
402 S.C. at 317, 741 S.E.2d at 518. "Statutory standing exists, as the name
implies, when a statute confers a right to sue on a party, and determining whether a
statute confers standing is an exercise in statutory interpretation." Id.
Constitutional standing, according to the United States Supreme Court, requires the
plaintiff meet three factors: (1) "the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'";
(2) "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of"; and (3) "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that
the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'" Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations omitted). 6

In Sea Pines Ass'n for the Protection of Wildlife, Inc. v. South Carolina
Department of Natural Resources, 345 S.C. 594, 601-03, 550 S.E.2d 287, 291-92
(2001), our supreme court applied the three-part standing test enunciated in Lujan.
If statutory standing exists, the Lujan factors are inapplicable. Freemantle v.
Preston, 398 S.C. 186, 193-94, 728 S.E.2d 40, 43-44 (2012). However, when no
statute confers standing, the elements of constitutional standing must be met by the
plaintiff. Youngblood, 402 S.C. at 317, 741 S.E.2d at 518. "Generally, a party
must be a real party in interest to the litigation to have standing." Sloan v. Friends
of the Hunley, Inc., 369 S.C. 20, 28, 630 S.E.2d 474, 479 (2006). "A real party in
interest is a party with a real, material, or substantial interest in the outcome of the
litigation." Id.

Chappell admitted he was employed only by Ladles James Island, LLC; thus, we
find under the SCWPA, which requires an employer/employee relationship to
maintain a claim, he did not have statutory standing as to Respondents. We also
find Chappell had no constitutional standing under the Lujan factors because he
was not aggrieved by any Respondents. Thus, we find the circuit court did not err
in finding Chappell did not have standing. See Powell ex rel. Kelley v. Bank of

6
Public importance standing is "conferred upon a party when an issue is of such
public importance as to require its resolution for future guidance." ATC S., Inc. v.
Charleston County, 380 S.C. 191, 198, 669 S.E.2d 337, 341 (2008) (quoting Davis
v. Richland Cnty. Council, 372 S.C. 497, 500, 642 S.E.2d 740, 741 (2007)). Only
constitutional and statutory standing are implicated in this case.
Am., 379 S.C. 437, 444, 665 S.E.2d 237, 241 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding a bank did
not have standing over escrowed funds because it was not an aggrieved party). 7

III. Class Certification

Appellant argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment prior to
hearing Chappell's motion for class certification and prior to allowing discovery on
the class action issues. We disagree.

Rule 23, SCRCP, provides the prerequisites to a class action:

One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if the court
finds (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,
and (5) in cases in which the relief primarily sought is not
injunctive or declaratory with respect to the class as a
whole, the amount in controversy exceeds one hundred
dollars for each member of the class.

7
To the extent Appellant argues this court should adopt the juridical links doctrine
as an exception to standing, we find the issue is not preserved for appellate review.
See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is
axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have
been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate
review."); Gardner v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 353 S.C. 1, 23 n.14, 577 S.E.2d 190,
201 n.14 (2003) (rejecting the plaintiff's request to adopt the juridical links
doctrine); see generally Matte v. Sunshine Mobile Homes, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d
805, 822 (W.D. La. 2003) (explaining the "juridical links doctrine has no bearing
on the issue of standing [and i]nstead, it provides an exception to the Rule 23(a)
requirement of 'typicality' and/or 'adequacy of representation' in class actions
against multiple defendants").
A plaintiff cannot maintain a class action where the record indicates he was not
directly harmed by the defendant's actions. Edisto Fleets, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n,
256 S.C. 350, 353-54, 182 S.E.2d 713, 714 (1971). Because we determined
Chappell was not directly harmed by any Respondents in our discussion of
standing, we find the circuit court did not err in granting Respondents' motions for
summary judgment while the class action status was pending.

IV. SCPWA

Appellant argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because the
Franchising Respondents were employers liable under the SCPWA. We disagree.

In its order granting the Franchising Respondents' motion for summary judgment,
the circuit court held it was "elementary" that Chappell could not sue a business
under the SCPWA unless he had worked for the business. The court noted "an
employee may only recover for unpaid wages from his own employer, as there can
be no unpaid wages due from a person or entity for whom one has provided no
labor or services."

"[T]he purpose of the [SCPWA] is 'to protect employees from the unjustified and
willful retention of wages by the employer.'" Mathis v. Brown & Brown of S.C.,
Inc., 389 S.C. 299, 317, 698 S.E.2d 773, 782 (2010) (quoting Rice v. Multimedia,
Inc., 318 S.C. 95, 98, 456 S.E.2d 381, 383 (1995)). The SCPWA permits an
employee to recover three times the amount of unpaid wages, plus fees, against an
employer. S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-80(C) (2021). In Williams v. South Carolina
Department of Corrections, 372 S.C. 255, 258, 641 S.E.2d 885, 887 (2007), our
supreme court stated the general four-part test 8 to determine whether an employer-
employee relationship exists is not determinative of employment status in the
context of the SCPWA. The court stated, "This Act, by its very title, is concerned
specifically with the payment of wages and is directed to the entity responsible for
such payment." Id. (emphasis in original).

Appellant argues the Franchising Respondents are liable under the SCPWA
because they had an agency relationship with the Ladles Soups operating
companies and franchisees. Appellant states the circuit court's order found no
agency relationship existed between the Franchising Respondents and the other

8
The general four-part test to determine the existence of an employer/employee
relationship consists of "(1) the right to, or exercise of, control; (2) method of
payment; (3) furnishing of equipment; and (4) right to fire." Id.
Ladles Soups franchisees because of a paragraph in the Ladles Soups Franchise
Agreement that purports to make the parties independent contractors. However,
Appellant argues that in Fernander v. Thigpen, 278 S.C. 140, 144, 293 S.E.2d 424,
427 (1982), our supreme court found sufficient evidence in the record to create a
jury issue as to whether an agency relationship existed between a restaurant
franchisee and franchisor where the franchise agreement showed that the
franchisor retained the right to control the detailed operation of the enterprise.
Appellant asserts the Franchise Agreement in this case gave the Franchising
Respondents extensive rights to "direct or supervise the daily affairs" of the
franchisees, including the power to bind them with agreements between third
parties as indicated by the section pertaining to the marketing fund. Further,
Appellant argues the Franchising Respondents had knowledge of the policy of
withholding credit card tips; had the power to stop the policy; and knowingly
permitted the franchisees to wrongfully withhold credit card tips by participating in
the decision to do so and benefiting from the policy. Therefore, Appellant claims
there was sufficient evidence in the record to create a jury issue as to whether an
agency relationship existed between the Franchising Respondents and the
franchisees.

The Franchise Agreement is devoid of any reference to the franchisees'
compensation policies. Teri Owens, the owner of Ladles Soups James Island,
which was Chappell's employer, testified in her deposition that her restaurant
operates as an independent contractor separate and apart from the Franchising
Respondents; the Franchising Respondents had no authority to set Ladles Soups
James Island's compensation policy; and the Franchising Respondents did not have
a policy for how to handle credit card or cash tips. Corey Paul, another franchise
owner, testified in his deposition that the Franchise Agreement did not direct
owners how to compensate employees and there was no policy on how to handle
credit card or cash tips. Julie Dyke, owner of Ladlessoups Mount Pleasant, also
testified in her deposition that there was no franchise-wide policy about handling
credit card tips. Even if all franchises had a policy of withholding tips, we find no
evidence an agency relationship existed that changed the relationship of Chappell
to employee-employer with any of Respondents. Therefore, we find the circuit
court did not err in granting summary judgment to Respondents on Chappell's
SCPWA claim because none of Respondents were Chappell's employers. See
Williams, 372 S.C. at 258, 641 S.E.2d at 887 (finding the SCPWA "is concerned
specifically with the payment of wages and is directed to the entity responsible for
such payment").

V. Jury Question
Appellant argues the circuit court erred in not finding an issue of triable fact for the
jury regarding the tipping policies of the Mount Pleasant Respondents and the
Franchising Respondents. We disagree.

"In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, [an appellate c]ourt applies the
same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56, SCRCP: summary
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Pittman v. Grand Strand
Ent., Inc., 363 S.C. 531, 536, 611 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2005). "In determining
whether any triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and all inferences that can
reasonably be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party." Singleton v. Sherer, 377 S.C. 185, 196, 659 S.E.2d 196, 202
(Ct. App. 2008). "If triable issues exist, those issues must go to the jury." Id.
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 197, 659 S.E.2d at 202.

As to the Mount Pleasant Respondents, Appellant does not cite any case law for
this argument; therefore, the issue is deemed abandoned. See Rule 208(b)(1)(E),
SCACR (requiring citation to authority in the argument section of an appellant's
brief); First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994)
(noting when a party fails to cite authority or when the argument consists of mere
allegations, the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue on appeal).

As to the Franchising Respondents, Appellant asserts the circuit court erred in
granting summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Respondents came into possession of credit card tips claimed by
Appellant through their royalty fees from Ladles Soups franchisees, including
Ladles Soups James Island. We disagree. For even a percentage of the tips
claimed by Appellant to have come into the Franchising Respondents' possession,
they would have to have been first collected by Chappell's employer, Ladles Soups
James Island, who would have then had to have paid a portion of the tips to Ladles
Franchising, Inc. Teri Owens, the owner of Ladles Soups James Island, testified in
her deposition that she did not pay a percentage of the tips to the franchise and
Chappell has not provided a scintilla of evidence to the contrary. Bass v. Gopal,
Inc., 384 S.C. 238, 246 n.6, 250, 680 S.E.2d 917, 921 n.6, 923 (Ct. App. 2009),
aff'd, 395 S.C. 129, 716 S.E.2d 910 (2011) (affirming the grant of summary
judgment and noting the party opposing summary judgment failed to provide even
a scintilla of evidence to withstand summary judgment). Viewing the evidence and
its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Appellant, we find the
evidence as a whole is susceptible of only one reasonable inference—that the
Franchising Respondents never came into possession of Chappell's credit card tips.
Thus, no jury issue existed and the circuit court did not err in granting summary
judgment to the Franchising Respondents.

VI. Requests for Admissions

Appellant argues the circuit court erred in failing to deem admitted certain requests
for admission by the Charleston Respondents. We disagree.

"[A]n unappealed ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case." Atl. Coast
Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285
(2012). Appellant's argument arises from the circuit court's order of January 7,
2020, denying his motion to deem the requests admitted. However, Appellant's
notice of appeal states the only orders on appeal are the circuit court's February 11,
2020 order granting summary judgment and the February 25, 2020 order denying
reconsideration. Appellant's failure to appeal the January 7, 2020 order prohibits
review by this court, and the issue concerning the denial of Appellant's requests for
admissions is the law of the case.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the orders on appeal are

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, MCDONALD and HEWITT, JJ., concur.